Users who downloaded this article also downloaded: (2014),"Critical success factors for implementation of risk assessment and management practices within the Tanzanian construction industry", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. 21 Iss 3 pp. 291-319 http://dx.If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. AbstractPurpose -The purpose of this paper is to present an experiment to test the effect of construction demand on the mark-up price level in construction contract auctions. Design/methodology/approach -An experimental approach was adopted for this study. In a controlled laboratory environment, a first-price sealed bid auction was simulated with varying number of projects available over ten rounds to simulate changing construction demand. Two experimental treatments were run in parallel, one exhibiting a "booming" demand over time, and the other group with a "recession" scenario. The experiment involved student (inexperienced) bidders with a construction project management background. Findings -The results show that inexperienced bidders do behave differently when subjected to varying levels of construction demand. Variations in the bid price level are affected by varying levels of construction demand and the general mark-up level for the bidders experiencing a booming scenario was higher on average compared to bidders subjected to the recession scenario. Research limitations/implications -An identified limitation of this study is the use of student subjects in the experiment, thus the experiment results are limited in generalisation to inexperienced bidders. Further studies may be able to replicate the experiment with experienced industry practitioners to observe the results. Practical implications -The results allow for industry practitioners to gain a stronger understanding of the effects of varying levels of construction demand and the need to consider construction demand in construction contracting. For construction clients, the level of construction demand may be used as an indicator to assist in the timing to call tenders to achieve a desirable price. For contractors, increased awareness of how demand affects competition and the price level will allow additional optimisations to be achieved in the b...

With the goal to achieve efficiency in bidding competitions, many codes of bidding procedure recommend clients provide contractors with bidding feedback information. Contractors strive to bid competitively via learning based on their experiences in past bidding attempts. The level of bidding feedback information, however, varies across clients. In many cases, clients do not provide feedback or provide insufficient feedback to contractors. Focussing on two information feedback conditions (full and partial), we examine: (i) the changes in bidding trend over time, and (ii) the effects of bidding feedback information on bidders’ competitiveness in bidding. Data were gathered using a bidding experiment that involved student (inexperienced) bidders with a construction project management background. The results show that the variations in bids over time for full information feedback condition are statistically significant, but not for bids from bidders with partial bidding feedback information. Bidders with full bidding feedback information are more competitive than those with partial bidding feedback information. The findings add to both our theoretical and empirical understanding of construction bidding: an understanding of the process of changes in the price of building work, and how the process can be manipulated through the release of bidding feedback information.

Purpose – Contractors rely on effective pricing methods in order to translate potential business into reality for long-term survival of their firms. This involves effective utilization of bidding feedback information toward winning jobs with high profit potential. The purpose of this paper is to experimentally investigate student (inexperienced) bidders’ competitiveness under full and partial information feedback conditions when the number of competing bidders is large (n=12). Design/methodology/approach – This paper adopted an experimental research design. The design used between-subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable with 120 students who enrolled in a cost-estimating course participated in the experiment. Findings – The result shows that the variations in bids over time for both levels of information feedback are statistically significant. It is found that bidders with full bidding feedback information are more competitive than those with partial bidding feedback information. The bid-spread analysis and the identified effect of these two information feedback conditions on awarded contract sum, provide some further evidence that full information feedback condition would lead to lower average bids in construction bidding. Practical implications – The implication of the findings for construction clients is that they should provide as much bidding feedback information as possible so that the bid prices will be competitive. Originality/value – Given the ambiguity inherent in field data, this paper provides strong justification of using experimental research design in advancing the understanding of construction pricing under different information feedback conditions. In addition, it demonstrated the suitability of using student subjects in similar experiments in the context of construction bidding.

With the goal to achieve efficiency in bidding competitions, many codes of bidding procedure recommend clients provide contractors with bidding feedback information. Contractors strive to bid competitively via learning based on their experiences in past bidding attempts. The level of bidding feedback information, however, varies across clients. In many cases, clients do not provide feedback or provide insufficient feedback to contractors. Focussing on two information feedback conditions (full and partial), we examine: (i) the changes in bidding trend over time, and (ii) the effects of bidding feedback information on bidders' competitiveness in bidding. Data were gathered using a bidding experiment that involved student (inexperienced) bidders with a construction project management background. The results show that the variations in bids over time for full information feedback condition are statistically significant, but not for bids from bidders with partial bidding feedback information. Bidders with full bidding feedback information are more competitive than those with partial bidding feedback information. The findings add to both our theoretical and empirical understanding of construction bidding: an understanding of the process of changes in the price of building work, and how the process can be manipulated through the release of bidding feedback information.

Construction remains a significant area of public expenditure. An understanding of the process of changes in construction pricing, and how the process can be manipulated through the release of bidding feedback information is vital, in order to best design clients’ procurement policies. This paper aims to statistically model inexperienced individual bidders’ learning in recurrent bidding under partial and full information feedback conditions. Using an experimental dataset, the developed linear mixed model contains three predictor variables, namely: time factor, information feedback conditions, and bidding success rate in the preceding round. The results show nonlinearity and curvature in the bidders’ learning curves. They are generally less competitive in time periods after a winning bid with lower average bids submitted by those subjected to full information feedback condition. In addition, the model has captured the existence of heterogeneity across bidders with individual-specific parameter estimates that demonstrate the uniqueness of individual bidders’ learning curves in recurrent bidding. The findings advocate for adequate bidding feedback information in clients’ procurement design to facilitate learning among contractors, which may in turn lead to increased competitiveness in their bids.