This article addresses the joint cost allocation problem in context of firm’s price policy, market structure, enforcement of tax, environmental and antitrust legislation and the correlating problem of incentives’ design. The paper presents the theoretical foundations to distinguish such concepts as joint and by-product, their correlation with the category of waste. Moreover, the authors provide a comparative analysis of different methods of joint cost allocations and their areas of applicability. The practical part of this work involves the overview of actual practices of cost allocation in chemical industry. It confirms the need for an adjusted approach assessment of the efficiency and legitimacy of joint production in each particular case.

The article reflects the main aspects that should be taken into account in developing and changing the regulation of intellectual property sphere. Being harmful in some aspects, piracy also has a number of properties that can be useful for copyright owners: information, network and indirect effects. The paper presents a mathematical model showing the case where the protection of intellection activity result can cause more damage to public welfare than piracy itself. The findings show a need for tools more flexible than the intellectual property system so that every copyright owner can choose the required level of protection.

Big data includes information about the characteristics of individual consumers, which allows sellers to individualize price (and not only) offers in such a way as to consider a willingness to pay of individual buyers or groups of buyers. The essential issues discussed in this paper are: the presence / absence of a specific research field through the lens of the coordination and distribution effects of individualized pricing; the existence of the basis for a special regime of antitrust regulation, as well as the related set of issues in the field of economic analysis of law.