We study how unionisation a¤ects competitive selection between heterogeneous …rms when wage negotiations can occur at the …rm or at the pro…t-centre level. With productivity speci…c wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety e¤ect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic …rms and toughen it for exporters. With pro…t-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can a¤ect wage inequality among identical workers both across …rms (via its e¤ects on competitive selection) and within …rms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

We analyze how increases in the market size and in the level of international integration affect the process of selection among firms with heterogeneous productivity levels when they are interconnected by vertical linkages. We show that when vertical linkages among firms are relatively weak (strong), an increase in the market size softens (toughens) the competition facing firms in this market and more firms of a lower (higher) efficiency survive, increasing (decreasing) the welfare level. Moreover, an increase in the level of economic integration softens competition only for intermediate vertical linkages, worsening the welfare level only for strong linkages.

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We provide novel insights on the decentralization of optimal outcomes under monopolistic competition with nonseparable utility, variable demand elasticity, and endogenous firm heterogeneity. Relative to the unconstrained optimum, equilibrium firm selection is too weak, average firm size is too small, low-cost firms are too small, and high-cost firms are too large. The unconstrained optimum can be decentralized through differentiated production subsidies to producers financed through lump-sum taxes on entrants and consumers. When differentiated subsidies and transfers from entrants are not viable, the constrained optimum can be decentralized through a common production subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax on consumers.

After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium seems to be largest when selection among heterogeneous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity.