This paper models balanced-budget redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough 'stochastic heterogeneity' with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's 'principle of minimum differentiation', and of 'Director's Law', are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions, and voter's possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lumpsum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper analyzes the interplay between sodal norms and economic incentives in the context of work dedsions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices, one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers, and one political, how large the transfer should be. The model highlights certain factors determining the size of the welfare state. Doc: lnw1. tex. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Multi-Task Learning and the Reorganization of Work. From Tayloristic to Holistic OrganizationAssar Lindbeck Dennis J. Snower The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor markets, (2) internationalization of labor markets and European integration, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in transition, (5) the future of work, and (6) general labor economics. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. The paper analyzes the contemporary organizational restructuring of production and work within firms. We emphasize the shift from a "Tayloristic" organization of work (characterized by significant specialization by tasks) to a "holistic" organization (featuring job rotation, integration of tasks and learning across tasks). We examine four driving forces behind this restructuring process: advances in production technologies promoting technological task complementarities, advances in information technologies promoting informational task complementarities, changes in worker preferences in favor of versatile work, and advances in human capital that make workers more versatile. Our analysis can also help explain the recent widening of wage differentials and disparities in job opportunities, not only between groups with similar characteristics, but also within these groups.JEL Classification: J23, J24, L23, M12, O33.

T he insider-outsider theory examines the behavior of economic agents in markets where some participants have more privileged positions than others. Incumbent workers in the labor market, the "insiders," often enjoy more favorable employment opportunities than the "outsiders." The reason for this disparity is that firms incur labor turnover costs when they replace insiders by outsiders. In practice, the distinction between insiders and outsiders is a matter of degree.The most obvious labor turnover costs are the costs of hiring, firing and providing firm-specific training, but further costs can arise from the attempts of insiders to resist competition with outsiders by refusing to cooperate with or harassing outsiders who try to underbid the wages of incumbent workers. Since these costs are borne, at least in part, by the employers, they give the insiders market power. The insiders use this power to push their wages above the marketclearing level, but firms do not try to replace them with outsiders since it would be costly to do so. The insider-outsider theory then proceeds to examine the implications of this behavior for employment and unemployment Snower, 1984, 1986).Insider-outsider theory was originally constructed as a microeconomic foun-

Subscriptions and Single Issues Individuals Individuals may subscribe directly from MIT Press Journals or shop online. See ordering information on p. 42. Subscriptions purchased at the individual rate may not be transferred to an institution. Subscriptions purchased at the individual, student, and retired rates are strictly for personal, non-commercial use only. The reselling of these subscriptions is strictly prohibited. Libraries Libraries may order through an agent or directly from MIT Press Journals.