We examine how, in a utility company, existing practices and performance systems limited the scope of situated learning. We contribute to the understanding of situated learning by exploring how confl ict, systems and artefacts also shape the trajectory of situated learning rather than just a sense of identity or meaningful participation. Systems and artefacts mediate interactions in organizations and potentially contribute to boundaries between teams, resulting in 'islands of practice' and stark variations in performance. This case study broadens our understanding of situated learning in organizations by challenging the relevance of 'community' in contemporary organizations where confl ict and transience may be prevalent. We argue that practices and objects/artefacts are a fruitful way of researching organizational learning; situated learning in organizations is likely to be continually emerging against a constant battle to stabilize an appropriate set of practices that support the aims of management.

Throughout the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tajikistan became, on the surface at least, an increasingly important political partner to Iran. Tajikistan according to Ahmadinejad was a “strategic partner” and in fact the two states' “common history and culture” made them inseparable. Ahmadinejad's emphasis on Tajikistan within Iran's broader foreign policy led to considerable discussion among regional observers and analysts who declared that the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan could potentially develop into a so‐called “Persian alliance,” which could reorder the regional political balance. However, lying just below the surface of relations between Iran and Tajikistan was a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality. This article argues that despite the public amity that existed between the two states, strong and substantive Iran‐Tajik relations were not achieved by the close of Ahmadinejad's presidency. This was due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian foreign policy approach, which often led to the mismanagement of this interstate relationship. This factor along with the unwillingness of Tajik elites to go from words to deeds and the broader impact of sanctions, international isolation, and regional rivalry, meant that Iran was largely unable to fulfill its prominent political and economic objectives in Tajikistan.

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