One aspect of the agency theory suggests that controlling shareholders exploit firm's resources for personal benefits and thus, expropriate minority shareholders. Politically-connected controlling shareholders tend to have stronger influence and control over firms. They believe the political connection that they posses may provide them a stronger and more secure position which allow them to expropriate minority shareholders. This study aims to examine and analyze the influence of cash holdings and capital structure on expropriation. Furthermore, it aims to determine the moderating impact of political connection and board of commissioners' effectiveness toward the relationship between cash holdings and capital structure on expropriation. A multiple linear regression with moderation analysis has been applied to examine these relationships. Samples were selected through the purposive sampling method which derived a total of 71 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2017 to 2019. The study shows that both cash holdings and capital structure have no impact on expropriation. Political connection weakens the impact of cash holdings on expropriation, but has no impact on the relationship of capital structure on expropriation. Meanwhile, board of commissioners' effectiveness has no impact neither toward the relationship between cash holdings nor capital structure on expropriation.