Spatial frequencies in an image influence visual analysis across a distributed, hierarchically organized brain network. Low spatial frequency (LSF) information may rapidly reach high-order areas to allow an initial coarse parsing of the visual scene, which could then be "retroinjected" through feedback into lower level visual areas to guide finer analysis on the basis of high spatial frequency (HSF). To test this "coarse-to-fine" processing scheme and to identify its neural substrates in the human brain, we presented sequences of two spatial-frequency-filtered scenes in rapid succession (LSF followed by HSF or vice versa) during fMRI and ERPs in the same participants. We show that for low-to-high sequences (but not for high-to-low sequences), LSF produces a first increase of activity in prefrontal and temporo-parietal areas, followed by enhanced responses to HSF in primary visual cortex. This pattern is consistent with retroactive influences on low-level areas that process HSF after initial activation of higher order areas by LSF.

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Drawing on decades of research suggesting an attentional advantage for self‐related information, researchers generally assume that self‐related stimuli automatically capture attention. However, a literature review reveals that this claim has not been systematically examined. We aimed to fill in this dearth of evidence. Following a feature‐based account of automaticity, we set up four experiments in which participants were asked to respond to a target preceded by a cue, which was self‐related or not. In Experiment 1, larger cuing effects (faster reaction times to valid versus invalid trials) were found with a participant's own name compared with someone else's name. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with unconscious cues. Experiment 3 suggested that these effects are not likely driven by familiarity. In Experiment 4, participants experienced greater difficulties from having their attention being captured by their own compared with someone else's name. We conclude that attentional capture by self‐related stimuli is automatic in the sense that it is unintentional, unconscious, and uncontrolled. Implications for self‐regulation and intergroup relations are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.