BackgroundSignificant quantities of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to treat HIV/AIDS have been procured for Sub-Saharan Africa for the first time in their 20-year history. This presents a novel opportunity to empirically study the roles of brand and generic suppliers in providing access to ARVs.Methodology/Principal FindingsAn observational study of brand and generic supply based on a dataset of 2,162 orders of AIDS drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa reported to the Global Price Reporting Mechanism at the World Health Organization from January 2004-March 2006 was performed. Generic companies supplied 63% of the drugs studied, at prices that were on average about a third of the prices charged by brand companies. 96% of the procurement was of first line drugs, which were provided mostly by generic firms, while the remaining 4%, of second line drugs, was sourced primarily from brand companies. 85% of the generic drugs in the sample were manufactured in India, where the majority of the drugs procured were ineligible for patent protection. The remaining 15% was manufactured in South Africa, mostly under voluntary licenses provided by brand companies to a single generic company. In Sub-Saharan African countries, four first line drugs in the dataset were widely patented, however no general deterrent to generic purchasing based on a patent was detected.Conclusions/SignificanceGeneric and brand companies have played distinct roles in increasing the availability of ARVs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Generic companies provided most of the drugs studied, at prices below those charged by brand companies, and until now, almost exclusively supplied several fixed-dose combination drugs. Brand companies have supplied almost all second line drugs, signed voluntary licenses with generic companies, and are not strictly enforcing patents in certain countries. Further investigation into how price reductions in second line drugs can be achieved and the cheapest drugs can actually be procured is warranted.

The America Invents Act requires the study of the positive and negative effects of patent assertion entities ("PAEs" or "trolls") 3 on the economy. This report provides one account of these impacts, as they are experienced by young technology companies. How patent demands impact startups is critical because they are a vital source of innovation and new jobs, 4 and whether patents hurt or help is fiercely debated. In addition, little attention has been paid to date to the distributional impacts of PAE suits. Small companies and startups are more vulnerable to failure than large, well-established companies, and the implications of this vulnerability as it relates to patent demands are not well understood. To assess the impact of trolls on startups, I analyzed a comprehensive database of patent litigations from 2006 to the present, conducted a non-random survey of 223 tech company startups, 79 of which had received a demand, and interviewed nearly twenty subjects with relevant knowledge of startup patent issues.Although large companies tend to dominate patent headlines, most unique defendants to troll suits are small. Companies with less than $100M annual revenue represent at least 66% 5 of 1 I thank my interview subjects and survey respondents, RPX Corp. and in particular

Over the last decade, dozens of states and the federal government have enacted “second chance” reforms that increase the eligibility of individuals arrested, charged, or convicted of crimes to shorten their sentences, clear their criminal records, and/or regain the right to vote. While much fanfare has accompanied the increasing availability of “second chances,” little attention has been paid to their delivery. This study introduces the concept of the “second chance gap,” which it defines as the difference between eligibility and delivery of second chance relief; explores its causes; and approximates its size in connection with several second chance laws and initiatives. Using administrative and other data, it finds that among a host of petition-based second chance opportunities, to shorten sentences, restore one’s vote, and clear one’s criminal convictions, only a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of those eligible for relief actually received it. Extrapolating based on a novel analysis of around sixty thousand criminal histories of persons primarily seeking gig-economy work and of the expungement laws governing nonconvictions of all fifty states applying the nonconviction expungement laws of all fifty states to around sixty thousand criminal histories of persons primarily seeking gig-economy work, this study estimates that at least twenty to thirty million American adults, or 30–40 percent of those with criminal records, fall into the “second chance expungement gap,” living burdened with criminal records that persist despite appearing to partially or fully clearable under existing law. These findings suggest that tens of millions of Americans are stuck in a paper prison, held back by deficiencies in the administration of second chances that have left them incarcerated, disenfranchised, or burdened by convictions beyond what the law requires. Some of the barriers to relief are structural and related to debt, overburdened bureaucracies, and the contested nature of second chance rules that unwind past judgments and policies. But others are harder to see and stem from administrative failures like unworkable standards, missing and incomplete criminal justice information (“dirty data”), a lack of awareness of second chance opportunities, and costly and complex processes. Fixing them—by moving administrative burdens from the defendant and onto the state and algorithms through automation, standardization, and ruthless iteration—can narrow the gap. Leveraging them, “Clean Slate” initiatives to automatically clear eligible criminal records can have the potential to help the millions of Americans in the second chance expungement gap. However, the ability of such second chance initiatives to improve outcomes depends on how they are implemented. Debt-related barriers and dirty data can contribute to incomplete automation, leading to “second second chance gaps.” In the realm of expungement, application of the expungement criteria to minor but not major offenses can also have the effect of exacerbating, not narrowing, existing racial disparities within the population of people with records, while improving them within the general population. Further research is needed to understand the impact of automated clearance under different scenarios, such as when the defendant is not notified of the relief received or there is a risk of statistical discrimination making things worse, not better. Overall, however, though other hurdles may remain, automation can remove the unfair collateral punishments, not steel bars, holding back tens of millions of Americans.

No abstract