Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Chair of Microeconomics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Germany Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may September 25, 2014Abstract: We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as symmetry. Players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment. In a strongly asymmetric setting, where one player has a higher endowment than the three other players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment.JEL classification: C92, D63, H41.

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Background Physicians’ financial interests might conflict with the best service to patients. It is essential to gain a thorough understanding of the effect of remuneration systems on physician behaviour. Methods We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment using a within-subject design to investigate physician behaviour underpayment heterogeneity. Each physician provided medical care to patients whose treatments were paid for under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). Results We observed that physicians customized their care in response to the payment system. FFS patients received considerably more medical care than did CAP patients with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-served FFS patients and under-served CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction, we observed neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover in FFS patients’ treatment. Conclusions The results suggest that, in our experimental model, fee regulation can be used to some extent to control physician spending since we did not identify a behavioural response to the CAP payment cut. Physicians did not recoup lost income by altering treatment behaviour toward CAP and/or FFS patients. Experimental economics is an excellent tool for ensuring the welfare of all those involved in the health system. Further research should investigate payment incentives as a means of developing health care teams that are more efficient.

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