We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one's epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment has a problematic consequence. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we articulate the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the problematic consequence is not, in fact, problematic. To preview: The version of pragmatic encroachment in view says that one knows that p only if one's epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, and the problematic consequence is one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. 1 1 By 'evidence for', we mean confirming evidence; by 'evidence against', we mean disconfirming evidence. 123Philos Stud

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