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The unsatisfactory nature of the frontiers between the independent African states is widely stressed, and provides an additional argument for those who would like to see a regrouping of the African scene in terms of larger political units. This short article discusses the boundary between Ghana and Togo—a classic example (it might be thought) of colonial division calling for early revision along rational lines. It was demarcated between Britain and France some 40 years ago: now African governments have come into existence on both sides under leaders who have given their support at one time or another to Pan-African movements for closer union. The alternative is likely to be constant friction, the interruption of trade, the harbouring of refugees seeking a base from which to continue a struggle already lost in their own country, and accusations by the party leaders in Ghana and Togo that these refugee organisations are actively sponsored by the Lomé or Accra governments. These unhappy consequences are indeed present today following the independence of Ghana in 1957 and Togo in 1960; and it is worth enquiring why they should have come about, in view of the great advantages which it is generally assumed would flow from a more cordial, open association between the two republics. In January 1963, the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio added a further, tragic element to the problem, although whether the coup d'état which installed a new, quasi-military government in Lome will materially alter the relationship between Ghana and Togo remains to be seen.

When I was in Ghana last year, Dr Danquah very kindly allowed me to read and make notes on an early Minute Book belonging to the Working Committee of the United Gold Coast Convention. I thought it was very interesting, for it covered the years 1947–51 when discontent with colonial rule came to a head, and produced first the U.G.C.C.—as it is easier to call it—and then its radical offspring, the Convention People's Party. The Minute Book was carefully, clearly written; it runs parallel to the early part of Nkrumah's Autobiography (ch. 5 to 12)—itself a valuable source of information—and it confirms, adds to and occasionally corrects the account given by Nkrumah of these interesting years when the colonial administration was beginning to retreat and the nationalists to advance. Moreover, in its beginning lay its end: the two chief protagonists in 1947 were Dr J. B. Danquah and Dr Kwame Nkrumah; and, thirteen years later, they were still opposed, as rival candidates for the presidency of the new republic.