This article proposes a 'systemic experiential learning model' for the evaluation of technological learning. Technological learning is effective when combining learning by doing, by searching and by interacting. The proposed model is based on parallels drawn between the typology -learning by doing, by searching and by interacting-and the Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory through its cyclical combination of action and reflection. It argues that learners, whether they be individuals, groups, organisations, or inter-organisations, are more effective when completing Kolb-like cycles. The proposed model is the combination of horizontal and vertical processes. Each learning level (individual, group, organisation or inter-organisation) is modelled, horizontally, according to a Kolblike learning cycle. Vertical connections are made between the horizontal levels of aggregation by borrowing March's concepts of 'exploration' and 'exploitation'. The model has been used for the evaluation of learning occurring in the Algerian small satellite capability-building programme. The implementation of the model revealed that learning is not systemic and therefore ineffective. Findings are reflective of the difficulty of striking the right balance between action (learning by doing) and reflection (learning by searching) and densifying interactions (learning by interacting) within and between learning levels.

Classic theories of deterrence do not envisage the concepts of resilience and deterrence as even remotely connected. However, these two notions may not be poles apart and may, in fact, offer complementary perspectives in envisioning options for dealing with the security challenges of the twenty-first century. This chapter explores the correspondence between the two concepts. Firstly, it discusses definitions and key tenets of these concepts in relation to security. Then, it goes on to review what differentiates and what links these concepts in terms of the risk approach each presents; this includes an examination of rationality in deterrence and resilience frameworks as well as looking at the growing acknowledgement that their evolution is influenced by systems thinking. The chapter then considers in what way deterrence theory and the emerging resilience theory display areas of complementary and mismatch. This is achieved by examining how, on the one hand, both approaches may be able to support one another and, on the other hand, how the significance of change and transformation in both frameworks can provide pointers to where future thinking might lead. Classic theories of deterrence do not envisage the concepts of resilience and deterrence as even remotely connected. However, these two notions may not be poles apart and may, in fact, offer complementary perspectives in envisioning options for dealing with the security challenges of the twenty-first century. This chapter explores the correspondence between the two concepts. Firstly, it discusses definitions and key tenets of these concepts in

Effective integration of the Regular and Reserve Armed Forces is essential to operational effectiveness, but evidence suggests that this remains problematic. Past research has focused on the professional values of Regulars and the perceptions that this group holds about Reservists. In this study, we argue that it is necessary to consider the perceptions of both Regulars and Reservists to truly understand the barriers to integration between these elements of Defence. This study investigates what Regular and Reserve Royal Marines see as the important constructs related to each group, through the use of repertory grid technique with 18 Regulars and 16 Reservists. Not only did the Regulars and Reservists in this study see different constructs as important, they also ascribed different constructs to each group. These differences are potentially problematic when aiming to integrate the Regular and Reserve Armed Forces.

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