There are different views on (in-)predictability and on (non-)cooperation in Russian foreign policy towards the West, but also on the question about how-that is, through which theoretical framework-to interpret it. This essay aims at contributing to the debate around these three issues. Its goal is to demonstrate the expediency of using a neoclassical realist theoretical perspective, enhanced by the inclusion of such subjective factors as status/prestige and perceptions. While there are factors in Russian domestic and foreign policy which give it a certain degree of unpredictability, nevertheless, if it is studied in a comprehensive way, it turns out to be more consistent and predictable than it at first seems. Even though Russia is often accused of being anti-Western and non-cooperative, this argument does not hold true: Russian foreign policy is selective and includes both cooperative and non-cooperative tactics.

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This essay explores Russia's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) policy, by focusing on two questions. First of all, analysts have noted Russia's disinterest and obstructive policies towards the Organization. Thus, the question is what Á if anything Á does the Russian Federation still want from the OSCE? Secondly, does the OSCE still serve as a forum for dialog? These two issues are studied on the basis of rational institutionalism and realism. The essay demonstrates that Russia is still interested in the OSCE, but its policy has become more pragmatic, selective and instrumentalist. It includes obstructive and constructive strategies. At the same time, today the Russian Federation ascribes less significance to the Organization in European security. This is predetermined not only by its inability to push its interests through the OSCE, but also by the declining interest of other participating States in the Organization. The differences between OSCE participants have turned it into a battlefield of interests in many areas.

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