Significant population declines in Acropora cervicornis and A. palmata began in the 1970s and now exceed over 90%. The losses were caused by a combination of coral disease and bleaching, with possible contributions from other stressors, including pollution and predation. Reproduction in the wild by fragment regeneration and sexual recruitment is inadequate to offset population declines. Starting in 2007, the Coral Restoration Foundation™ evaluated the feasibility of outplanting A. cervicornis colonies to reefs in the Florida Keys to restore populations at sites where the species was previously abundant. Reported here are the results of 20 coral outplanting projects with each project defined as a cohort of colonies outplanted at the same time and location. Photogrammetric analysis and in situ monitoring (2007 to 2015) measured survivorship, growth, and condition of 2419 colonies. Survivorship was initially high but generally decreased after two years. Survivorship among projects based on colony counts ranged from 4% to 89% for seven cohorts monitored at least five years. Weibull survival models were used to estimate survivorship beyond the duration of the projects and ranged from approximately 0% to over 35% after five years and 0% to 10% after seven years. Growth rate averaged 10 cm/year during the first two years then plateaued in subsequent years. After four years, approximately one-third of surviving colonies were � 50 cm in maximum diameter. Projects used three to sixteen different genotypes and significant differences did not occur in survivorship, condition, or growth. Restoration times for three reefs were calculated based on NOAA Recovery Plan (NRP) metrics (colony abundance and size) and the findings from projects reported here. Results support NRP conclusions that reducing stressors is required before significant population growth and recovery will occur. Until then, outplanting protects against local extinction and helps to maintain genetic diversity in the wild.

medical equipment, begun in 2009, has been described by economist Peter Cramton as "a train wreck waiting to happen." The CMS auction starts by accepting the lowest bidder and working its way up until tbere are enough providers to meet the demand. All providers are then reimbursed at the median of all accepted bids. One drawback is that providers who might find the reimbursement rate unacceptably low are not obligated to sign a contract. Cramton, along witb mathematician Sean Ellermeyer and economist Brett Katzman, performed a mathematical analysis showing that the CMS auction is likely to result in shortages, low quality and service, increased fraud, and increased costs. One problem is tbat a good auction design should bave an equilibrium bidding strategy that bidders will tend to discover over time, sucb tbat no bidder can do better by switching to a different strategy. The CMS auction has infinitely many sucb strategies, making it hard for bidders to know what to do. One sucb strategy is to bid a ridiculously low amount, since a single low bid is unlikely to lower the median, and tbe bidder is almost certain to win tbe auction. If many providers use this strategy, the final reimbursement rate will be too low, and most providers will decline tbe contract. Simulations demonstrated that tbe CMS auction would fail miserably. It is unclear bow tbe auctions did because CMS has not revealed tbe bids.