No abstract

nascent entrepreneurship, new venture creation,

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. The impact of contracts on trust in entrepreneur-VC relationships. Key words:Contracts, control, trust, agency theory, venture capital, small business. ABSTRACTVenture capitalists (VCs) increasingly rely on elaborate formal contracts and incentivization through share ownership to manage their relationships with the entrepreneurial firms they invest in. This study analyzes the impact of a high degree of such "neoclassical contracting"on entrepreneurs' trust in their VC backers. The results from a sample of 86 Dutch entrepreneurial firms indicate not only that a high degree of neoclassical contracting tends to erode entrepreneurs' trust in their VCs, but also that the use of more informal, relational contracting fails to moderate the negative association between a strong focus on neoclassical contracts and trust. However, entrepreneurs do welcome some level of monitoring, which highlights the enduring tension between trust and control, and the need for VCs to strike a productive balance.

Venture capitalists (VCs) contribute to entrepreneurial firms by engaging in governance activities, such as providing services and monitoring the entrepreneurial firm's operations and performance. This study examines the role and influence of the VC's governance activities on 93 Dutch entrepreneurial firms. Results suggest that while the VC's governance activities may help to stimulate the use of the entrepreneurial firm's control systems, they also moderate the relationship between the entrepreneurial firm's use of control systems and its financial performance. It appears in particular that cost control systems contribute positively to the entrepreneurial firm's financial performance when the VC provides service activities. However, the use of cost control systems tends to be negatively related to the entrepreneurial firm's financial performance when the VC is highly focused on monitoring.

No abstract