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Some people assign negative values for new products sold on laboratory auction blocks (i.e., irradiated meat). We explore bidding behavior in two Vickrey auctions when people have positive- and negative-induced values for the good. Aggregate bidding in the second-price auction is precise but biased—highest-value positive bidders tend to overstate benefits, whereas lowest-negative bidders understate losses. In contrast, bidding behavior in the random nth-price auction is demand revealing irrespective of induced value, but it is imprecise. Examining on- and off-margin bidding behavior, we cannot conclude that any segments of demand are significantly different than the demand revealing regression line. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

18 19Rates of adoption of pro-environmental practices in agriculture in many parts of the world are 20 low. In some cases, this is attributable to the private costs borne by farmers to adopt these 21 practices, often well in advance of any benefits -public or private -that they may bring.

Journal articleIFPRI3; CRP2; ISIEPTD; PIMPRCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM