Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on carbon emission force enterprises to take carbon emission into consideration when making production decisions. In this paper, in the context of allowing emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology, models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment and pricing decisions. The results indicate that manufacturer's endurance capacity of reduction difficulty is higher in the cooperation model than in the Stackelberg game model, and that perfect coordination of supply chains can be realized by a revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of a consumer, low-carbon products mean higher price, so that subsidies or tax exemptions should be provided to keep low prices. Meanwhile, the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction targets by controlling emission trading price, strengthening emission reduction publicity and providing technology investment subsidies.

This paper research on how hazardous chemicals transportation provider optimal transportation solution supposed transportation risk (i.e. releasing of chlorine) may happen in the process of transportation. If the government attaches much importance to environment protection and pushes severe punishment on environment pollution, the hazardous chemicals transportation provider should consider two goals together: minimizing the individual transportation cost and minimizing the social transportation cost. Then this paper develops a goal programming model which contains two goals for the problem. Which goal is important will affect the objective function of this model. Through discussion on importance compare of two goals, this paper believes that government policy is very important to inspirit hazardous chemicals transportation providers complying with laws and protecting environment.