PurposeThis study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government departments, and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system of PB construction.Design/methodology/approachConsidering the information asymmetry between government supervision departments and construction contractors and the interactive relationship between the two parties under bounded rationality, we propose an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of PBs and analyze the evolutionary strategy of the game. The system dynamics (SD) method is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under a dynamic supervision strategy and the adjustment of external variables.FindingsThe cost difference between the government's strong and weak supervision, the construction contractor's additional expenditure for strengthening safety management, and other factors affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust the penalties based on the construction contractor's subjective willingness to ignore safety management and further adjust their rate of change based on the completion of the supervision goals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision.Originality/valueThis study makes contributions in two areas. Through a combination of SD and an evolutionary game, it provides new insights into the strategic choice of the main body related to PB construction safety. Additionally, considering the nonlinear characteristics of construction safety supervision, it provides useful universal suggestions for PB construction safety.

Public spaces are important places for various social functions and are also essential components of the cultural heritage of traditional settlements, which are suffering from blind function renewal and structural reconstruction during urbanization. It is essential to clarify the influence of spatial functions on spatial systems for the sustainable development of traditional settlements. Thus, based on the topology theory, we built a research framework for the relationship between public space functions and systems. Through field research, Pajek topological network analysis, and space syntax, we investigated the influence of spatial functions on the public space system of traditional settlements in terms of both structure and order. The research results of Zhang Guying Village demonstrate that (1) the public space of Zhang Guying Village has the structural characteristics of “axis-oriented and multi-core”; (2) the coordinated development of political, living, and traffic public spaces constitutes the formation logic of the public space system; (3) topological analysis of public spaces based on spatial functions helps in the optimization and functional reorganization of the public space system in traditional settlements. Hence, this study can provide understanding of the formation of the public space system and can also provide local administration adaptive reconfiguration strategies for the sustainable development of traditional settlements in the future.

The promotion of green construction is an important approach to achieve high-quality and sustainable development of China’s construction industry. In China, the government supervises contractors’ green construction behavior. However, due to factors such as high cost and immature construction technology, the contractor often does not have a strong interest to adopt green construction behavior. An evolutionary game model is constructed based on the interactive relationship between government and contractor under bounded rationality conditions. As the best way for public opinion to function, WeMedia mechanism is considered in the evolutionary game model from the perspective of public participation. The evolutionary game process of the two players is simulated by system dynamics. The results show that without the influence of WeMedia, the stability of the system evolution depends on two factors. One is the government’s penalty for contractor’s nongreen construction behavior and the other is government’s supervision performance brought from contractor’s green construction behavior. With the influence of WeMedia, when WeMedia’s willingness to positively propagandize the contractor’s green construction behavior strengthens, it can significantly promote the system to converge to the ideal stable strategy. While WeMedia’s capability to negatively expose the contractor’s nongreen construction behavior strengthens, it can also significantly promote the system to converge to the ideal stable strategy. Even if the government takes excessive penalties for the contractor’s nongreen construction behavior, the system can still converge to the ideal stable strategy, by adjusting the willingness of propaganda or the capability of exposure from WeMedia reasonably. With the influence of WeMedia in the green construction supervision game, this study analyzes how the positive propaganda and negative exposure of WeMedia influence the strategic choice of the game between the two parties, to provide suggestions on how the government can efficiently use the WeMedia to promote contractor’s green construction behavior.