No abstract

No abstract

We study an oligopoly consisting of M leaders and N followers that supply a homogeneous product (or service) noncooperatively. Leaders choose their supply levels first, knowing the demand function only in distribution. Followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply levels and the realized demand function. We term the resulting equilibrium a stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SMS) equilibrium. We show the existence and uniqueness of SMS equilibrium under mild assumptions. We also propose a computational approach to find the equilibrium based on the sample average approximation method and analyze its rate of convergence. Finally, we apply this framework to model competition in the telecommunication industry.

A key step in solving minimax distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problems is to reformulate the inner maximization w.r.t. probability measure as a semiinfinite programming problem through Lagrange dual. Slater type conditions have been widely used for strong duality (zero dual gap) when the ambiguity set is defined through moments. In this paper, we investigate effective ways for verifying the Slater type conditions and introduce other conditions which are based on lower semicontinuity of the optimal value function of the inner maximization problem. Moreover, we propose two discretization schemes for solving the DRO with one for the dualized DRO and the other directly through the ambiguity set of the DRO. In the absence of strong duality, the discretization scheme via Lagrange duality may provide an upper bound for the optimal value of the DRO whereas the direct discretization approach

No abstract