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In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long-term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: "No-Info" players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; "Min-Info" players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; "Mid-Info" players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and "Max-Info" players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real-world interactions.

Inhibition in task switching is inferred from slower reaction times returning to a recently performed task after one intervening trial (i.e. an ABA sequence) compared to returning to a task not recently performed (CBA sequence). These n-2 repetition costs are thought to reflect the persisting inhibition of a task after its disengagement. As such, the n-2 repetition cost is an attractive tool for the researcher interested in inhibitory functioning in clinical/neurological/neuroscience disciplines. In the literature, an absence of this cost is often interpreted as an absence of inhibition, an assumption with strong implications for researchers. The current paper argues that this is not necessarily an accurate interpretation, as an absence of inhibition should lead to an n-2 repetition benefit as a task's activation level will prime performance. This argument is supported by three instances of a computational cognitive model varying the degree of inhibition present. An inhibition model fits human n-2 repetition costs well. Removal of the inhibition-the activation-only model-predicts an n-2 repetition benefit. For the model to produce a null n-2 repetition cost, small amounts of inhibition were required-the reduced-inhibition model. The authors also demonstrate that a lateral-inhibition locus of the n-2 repetition cost cannot account for observed human data. The authors conclude that a null n-2 repetition cost provides no evidence on its own for an absence of inhibition, and propose reporting of a significant n-2 repetition benefit to be the best evidence for a lack of inhibition. Implications for theories on task switching are discussed.

a b s t r a c tWe present a computational cognitive model that explains transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction -Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. We summarize prior research showing that, when these games are played in sequence, the experience acquired in the first game influences the players' behavior in the second game. The same model accounts for human data in both games. The model explains transfer effects with the aid of a trust mechanism that determines how rewards change depending on the dynamics of the interaction between players. We conclude that factors pertaining to the game or the individual are insufficient to explain the whole range of transfer effects and factors pertaining to the interaction between players should be considered as well.

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