Calcitonin-gene-related peptide (CGRP) and adrenomedullin are related peptides with distinct pharmacological profiles. Here we show that a receptor with seven transmembrane domains, the calcitonin-receptor-like receptor (CRLR), can function as either a CGRP receptor or an adrenomedullin receptor, depending on which members of a new family of single-transmembrane-domain proteins, which we have called receptor-activity-modifying proteins or RAMPs, are expressed. RAMPs are required to transport CRLR to the plasma membrane. RAMP1 presents the receptor at the cell surface as a mature glycoprotein and a CGRP receptor. RAMP2-transported receptors are core-glycosylated and are adrenomedullin receptors.

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The dependency structure between wholesale-distributors and their major suppliers is posited to influence the type of contract—explicit and normative—used. In turn, dependency structure and type of contract is hypothesized to influence wholesale-distributor performance. This process occurs both directly and indirectly through some intermediate constructs, such as long-term orientation, relationship length, and relational behavior. The authors investigate three dependency structures: wholesaler dependent on supplier, supplier dependent on wholesaler, and high bilateral dependency. They obtain empirical support for many of the hypothesized linkages.

The authors examine three governance mechanisms according to how well they mitigate opportunism in marketing channels. Using the U.S. hotel industry as the research context, the authors investigate how opportunism is limited by (1) ownership, (2) investment in transaction-specific assets, and (3) norms of relational exchange. They also investigate how various combinations of these governance mechanisms affect opportunistic behavior in hotel channels. Overall, the results generally support emphasizing relational norms in managing opportunism in marketing channels. The results also indicate that opportunism can be exacerbated when ownership or investments in transaction-specific assets are accentuated as governance mechanisms.