Patients presenting with a GCS of 3 and FD pupils have no reasonable chance for survival. A significant percentage of these patients can be salvaged for organ donation. This information should be used in deciding to pursue aggressive resuscitation efforts and in discussing prognosis with family. Patients with a GCS of 3 who are not FD should be aggressively resuscitated because many of these patients survive to discharge.

Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive–experiential self‐theory (CEST) to juror decision‐making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.