This study examines two factors that may in uence the independence and objectivity of internal audit. The rst, affecting the organizational independence of the internal audit function, is its relationship with the audit committee. The second is the use of the function as a management training ground. It is argued that this practice might affect individual objectivity because internal auditors may be reluctant to withstand pressure from an auditee who could be their future supervisor. A survey of chief internal auditors in Singapore was undertaken to establish current practice in these areas and to identify relationships between these variables. A strong relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit function was found, with the level of interaction being greater when the audit committee was comprised solely of independent directors. The use of the internal audit function as a management training ground was also found to be quite widespread in Singapore.

This study examines the separate influence of independence and financial experience on audit committee relations with the internal audit function. Using data from Australia and New Zealand, the study focuses on audit committees and internal audit in both private and public sector entities. Data were collected by means of a questionnaire sent to chief internal auditors. The results suggest that independence and accounting experience have a complementary impact on audit committee relations with internal audit. Independence is more associated with issues of process while accounting experience is associated with the extent that the audit committee reviews the work of the internal audit function. There are also some differences based on country and sector. Overall, the findings have important implications for regulators in light of recent calls for audit committee members to have accounting expertise in addition to being independent.

This paper explores similarities and differences between public sector internal auditing and its counterpart in the private sector. Features examined include organizational status, outsourcing, using internal audit as a “tour of duty” function, activities and relationships with the external auditor. The study is based on a survey of chief internal auditors in organizations in Australia and New Zealand. Results suggest that there are differences in status between internal audit in the two sectors, with public sector internal auditors less likely to report to the chief financial officer. While a similar amount of work is outsourced, public sector organizations are more likely than those in the private sector to outsource to the external auditor. There is little difference between internal audit activities and interactions with external audit in the two sectors. However, private sector internal audit is perceived to lead to a greater reduction in audit fees compared to that in the public sector.

This study uses the Elaboration Likelihood Model as a theoretical framework to examine auditors' sensitivity to the integrity of an evidence source, the consistency of more than one piece of evidence and the interaction between these two factors. Two independent scenarios were examined. The first involved evidence provided by a source external to the client, namely a lawyer acting for the client in a lawsuit concerning patent infringement. Source integrity was manipulated as either high or low, while the evidence provided by the source was either consistent or inconsistent with evidence obtained from within the client. Participants assessed the likelihood that the client would be found guilty of patent infringement and whether any liability should be recognized in the financial statements. Both the integrity and consistency factors and their interaction were significant in explaining auditors' judgments. The second scenario involved representations from client management concerning inventory obsolescence. Management integrity was manipulated as high or low and the evidence provided by management was either consistent or inconsistent with other evidence obtained from within the client. Participants assessed the likelihood that inventory was overstated and that a further writedown was required. For this scenario, only the integrity factor was a significant determinant of auditors' judgments.

This study uses two hypothetical cases to examine the perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore about corporate governance practices relating to the quality of financial reporting and auditing. In the first case, the strength of the audit committee, the existence of an internal audit function and the strength of a corporate code of conduct were manipulated. All three variables were perceived to have some influence on financial reporting and audit quality. However, some interesting differences were found between the perceptions of auditors and directors. Auditors place more weight on the internal audit function, possibly due to their familiarity with the role that internal audit can play in reducing audit risk and enhancing controls. Directors have more confidence in board enforcement of a strong code of conduct, possibly reflecting the view that this encourages staff to adhere to higher ethical standards. In the second case, audit partner rotation, outsourcing of internal audit services and whether the audit firm audited all companies within a group were manipulated. Auditors believed that their ability to resist management pressure was enhanced when they audited all companies within the group. No significant differences were found for the other variables, suggesting that neither group believes that these practices impair audit independence.