The way Habermas has elaborated the tradition of Critical Theory makes his contribution difficult to evaluate. While he has undoubtedly rectified some of the most glaring theoretical defects of his predecessors, he has also markedly altered the spirit of their project. He has gained the theoretical advantages of his own position at the price of breaking with Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse on fundamental issues. This does not mean that these theoretical advances could have been achieved in a different manner, nor that the spirit of the early Frankfurt School ought to be preserved. It means that Habermas' theory so differs from his predecessors' as to seriously raise the question of continuity.' Two standard criticisms are usually raised against the early Frankfurt School: (1) their pessimism could only lead to resignation; and (2) the foundations of Critical Theory were never clarified so that the resulting critique of society was itself never justified. With respect to both these problems, Habermas' theory represents an advance. As for the first point, Habermas argues that the pessimism of the early Frankfurt School was not simply the result of a sober examination of historical forces, but, insofar as it resulted from tacit (and incorrect) theoretical presuppositions, was assumed at the outset. Concerning the second point, Habermas develops a transcendental argument to provide the epistemological and normative foundations for Critical Theory. It is here that his theoretical advances often result in blunting the thrust of the early Critical Theorists' vision. Given their analysis, a solution to the historical impasse of our time -however unlikely -requires reconciliation with nature. While providing a superior theoretical grounding for Critical Theory, Habermas' transcendentalism necessarily precludes any reconciliation with nature. Theoretical rigor is obtained at the expense of the original Utopian ideal.During its exile, the Frankfurt School sought to comprehend the new and deeply disturbing world situation. They located the cause of disparate phenomena such as European fascism and the American culture industry in the same over-riding historical tendency: i.e., the Enlightenment. While the Enlightenment's goal of improving "man's estate" through the progressive replacement of myth by reason and the conquest of nature may be laudable, its strategy is flawed: the domination of outer nature necessitates the domination of inner nature, i.e., the recasting of man's instinctual organization so that he becomes capable of exercising the type of renunciation necessary for the transformation of external nature: "The 1. See Axel Honneth, "Communication and Reconciliation," in Telos 39 (Spring, 1979), pp. 45-61. 2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972), p. 57. 3. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, however, myth already contains the dialectic of enlightenment in nuce and the enlightenment notion of rationality is not without mythical elements. 4. William Leis...

No abstract

The life and work of Sigmund Freud continue to fascinate general and professional readers alike. Joel Whitebook here presents the first major biography of Freud since the last century, taking into account recent developments in psychoanalytic theory and practice, gender studies, philosophy, cultural theory, and more. Offering a radically new portrait of the creator of psychoanalysis, this book explores the man in all his complexity alongside an interpretation of his theories that cuts through the stereotypes that surround him. The development of Freud's thinking is addressed not only in the context of his personal life, but also in that of society and culture at large, while the impact of his thinking on subsequent issues of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and social theory is fully examined. Whitebook demonstrates that declarations of Freud's obsolescence are premature, and, with his clear and engaging style, brings this vivid figure to life in compelling and readable fashion.

Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non‐sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre‐oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science‐and analysis in so far as it models itself on science‐and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.

No abstract