The rapid absorption of oxygen and appearance of off-odors in freeze-dried meats indicate that oxidative deterioration occurs.However, no peroxides were found and changes in spectral absorption of the fat, thiobarbituric acid reactive substances, and reducing capacity of the dried meats were small and could not be correlated with the absorption of oxygen. Of the several objective methods studied, oxygen absorption was the only one that could be used to indicate oxidation. Freeze-dried beef and chicken have been fractionated into their lipid and nonlipid components. The absorption of oxygen by the isolated fractions has been compared to that of the whole tissues. Autoxidation of freeze-dried meats takes place in two stages. The protein-bound lipids autoxidize first, without an induction period, and their initial rate of autoxidation decreases with time. After a period of lower oxygen absorption, the free glyceride fat begins to autoxidize in the autocatalytic manner characteristic of autoxidation in isolated glyceride fats.4 utoxidation of lipid is a serious cause of deterioration /A in freeze-dried meat. Lea (1943) recognized two types of defects in stored freeze-dried meats: a tallowy or oily flavor due to fat oxidation; and a mealy defect ascribed to deterioration of nonfat components.In studies with freeze-dried beef, Tappel ( 1956) and El-Gharbawi and Dugan (1965) found that protein-bound lipids autoxidized readily, whereas the free glyceride fat was very stable. In addition, Tappel (1956) reported that protein could account for 50 to 100% of the total oxygen absorbed by freeze-dried beef. However, Lea et al. (1958) observed that the residual protein of defatted herring meal did not oxidize readily.

In Vietnam during 1966 and 1967, the United States Army expended nearly half of its artillery ammunition in unobserved Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) strikes. By June 1970, the army had nearly eliminated H&I. The reasons for this shift inform the ongoing debate over American strategy during the Vietnam War. Although both General William C. Westmoreland and his successor, General Creighton W. Abrams, emphasized that poorly applied firepower could cause collateral damage, neither leader viewed H&I as inherently counterproductive. Indeed, both leaders responded to budgetary pressures, rather than concern over civilian casualties, when reducing H&I. Neither reduced H&I fire as part of a radical shift in strategy.

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