In this paper we make an empirical study of the relationship between risk disclosure and the cost of equity. In particular, the objective being pursued is to contrast whether or not the cost of equity for the company is related to its financial and non-financial risk disclosure. Our results show no statistically significant relationship between the latter and the cost of equity; and a statistically significant relationship, with a positive sign, between this cost and financial risk disclosure. This suggests that company risk disclosures appear to introduce unknown contingencies and risk factors rather than only update information about known risks. 106Contaduría y Administración 59 (4), octubre-diciembre 2014: 105-135 Divulgación de riesgos y costo de capital de los recursos propios. El caso español ResumenEn este trabajo se hace un estudio empírico de la relación entre la divulgación de riesgos por parte de las empresas y el costo de capital de los recursos propios. En particular, el objetivo que se persigue es contrastar si el costo de capital de los recursos propios está relacionado con la divulgación de riesgos financiero y no financiero. Nuestros resultados no muestran relación estadísticamente significativa entre el riesgo no financiero y el costo de capital de los recursos propios; y una relación estadísticamente significativa positiva entre este costo y la divulgación de riesgos financieros. Esto sugiere que las divulgaciones de riesgo de la empresa parecen presentar contingencias desconocidas y factores de riesgo en vez de sólo actualizar la información sobre los riesgos conocidos.Palabras clave: costo de los recursos propios, riesgo, información sobre riesgos Clasificación JEL: M41

Abstract-Within the Spanish legislation, the requirements for information disclosure depend on the kind of organization. Most of Spanish Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) work as charitable foundations (a legal categorization of non-profit organizations), organizations where we focus on. In this paper we analyse the requirements that Spanish law establishes for the disclosure of social impact information for charitable foundations. Social impact is, probably, the best benchmark to measure the performance of this kind of non-profit organizations.There must be underlined that Spain is divided into several regions (known as "Autonomias"), and some of these regions have specific rules for charitable foundations. Therefore, depending on the region where a NGO (foundation) is settled on, the requirements for information disclosure can vary. In this paper we compare the different requirements that regions establish for their NGOs (charitable foundations) in the field of disclosure of information on social impact. And we also reflect on the adequacy of this information to the requirements of the stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries, community, ….) Keywordssocial impact; information disclosure; transparency; non-profits I.

a b s t r a c tThe 2004 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Accord (known as Basel II) provides a common framework for banks to determine their minimum capital requirements for solvency purposes. For credit risk (the most important one for banking) Basel II uses an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model and, as we demonstrate in the paper, assumes two fundamental hypotheses: Firstly, that there is only one risk factor common to all banks; and secondly, that the number of debtors in bank portfolios is high enough to ensure that no single debtor's behaviour can have a significant impact on the portfolio value as a whole. This allows capital requirements to be estimated by using a model based on the percentage of defaulting borrowers (x).The model only requires values for two variables: the probability of default and loss if default occurs. Using a 99% likelihood and assuming that all sectors are equally correlated, the model estimates x through the cumulative distribution function for the Gaussian distribution.But many bank portfolios do not fit these hypotheses, and therefore the ASRF model underestimates actual capital requirements. Thus, a surcharge for concentration risk is required.There are two kinds of concentration risk (sector and name concentration risk), each one corresponding to the violation of one of the above mentioned hypotheses. Supervisory authorities are currently developing models to incorporate this surcharge into banking solvency rules. In Spain, the Spanish Central Bank bases its surcharge proposal for sectorial concentration on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). In this paper we show that HHI treats all sectors as equally risky and propose an alternative index (CI) in which sectors are weighted according to risk. Moreover, our index also incorporates the relations between each pair of sectors (in the HHI framework no sectorial relationship is considered). Our proposal is based on an adjusted variance-covariance matrix, in which negative covariances have been equalled to 0. We demonstrate the HHI is a particular case of our proposed index, by means of simplifying hypotheses.As we will show, the proposed index has two fundamental properties: it is lower and upper bounded; and it decreases as concentration and/or risk decreases. These properties allow the index to be incorporated into bank risk management models. In this way bank estimations can improve upon those based on the supervisory model and, according to banking rules, can also be used for determining the capital surcharge for sectorial concentration.

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