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Using U.S. steel firm data, we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit-forming. To identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms, we use an Expectation-Maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group. A twopool model emerges. occasional lobbyers' lobbying depends on their market performance and habitual lobbyers' lobbying only depends on past lobbying. The latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel. Our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection-dependent firms. JEL classification: F133

A class of generalized gamma distribution called the beta-gamma distribution is proposed. Some of its properties are examined. Its shape can be reversed J-shaped, unimodal, or bimodal. Reliability and hazard functions are also derived, and applications are discussed.

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