Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of.

Many have thought that certain types and distributions of apparent nonresistant nonbelief in the world are among the best reasons to think naturalism is more probable than theism. Jason Marsh has argued that one specific type of nonresistant nonbelief, called natural nonbelief in early humans, supports naturalism over theism. However, I will argue that it is epistemically possible that God has a morallysufficient reason for permitting natural nonbelief in early humans. First, according to Axiarchism, God's goal for physical reality is to intentionally structure it so that a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value will be realized. Second, since theism entails Axiarchism, and it is far from clear on our total available evidence that eliminating the possibility of natural nonbelief would have led to a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value being realized for early humans, the degree to which natural nonbelief supports naturalism over theism is softened. Then what is it all and what are we all? What is the point of it and of us? Perhaps one clue is that we can even ask these questions… Sophie's World It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, but the glory of kings is to search out a matter.Prov. 25:2 IntroductionMany have thought that certain types and distributions of apparent nonresistant nonbelief in the world are among the best reasons to think naturalism is more probable than theism. Jason Marsh has argued that a specific type of nonresistant nonbelief called natural nonbelief supports naturalism over theism.1 According to this argument, untold numbers of the earliest human beings were probably affectively2 willing 1 Marsh, "Darwin and the Problem of Natural NonBelief," 349-376. To be clear, Jason Marsh gives three reasons to think the implications of Darwinian evolution support naturalism over theism of which natural nonbelief is only one. I shall not consider his other two reasons here. 2 Schellenberg, "What Divine Hiddenness Reveals": "..in at least some of these people the absence of theistic belief is not in any way the result of their own emotional or behavioral opposition towards God or relationship with God or any of the apparent implications of such a relationship."

J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God's perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump's account of the nature of love is true, then any finite person flourishes the most only if they attain the greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. Moreover, if Humean externalism is true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties, as soon as possible, unless God sacrifices some time in the union-not the whole union-with them. Accordingly, God's perpetual openness might not be consistent with the future flourishing of any finite person-from which it follows that a crucial assumption of the hiddenness argument might not be true.

I survey John Leslie's Platonic thesis that if something sufficiently good possibly exists, then it could be ethically required that it actually exists-along with the pantheistic world-picture to which this thesis leads.