Lie detection techniques are frequently used, but most of them have been criticized for the lack of empirical support for their predictive validity and presumed underlying mechanisms. This situation has led to increased efforts to unravel the cognitive mechanisms underlying deception and to develop a comprehensive theory of deception. A cognitive approach to deception has reinvigorated interest in reaction time (RT) measures to differentiate lies from truths and to investigate whether lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Here, we provide the results of a meta-analysis of 114 studies (n = 3307) using computerized RT paradigms to assess the cognitive cost of lying. Results revealed a large standardized RT difference, even after correction for publication bias (d = 1.049; 95% CI [0.930; 1.169]), with a large heterogeneity amongst effect sizes. Moderator analyses revealed that the RT deception effect was smaller, yet still large, in studies in which participants received instructions to avoid detection. The autobiographical Implicit Association Test produced smaller effects than the Concealed Information Test, the Sheffield Lie Test, and the Differentiation of Deception paradigm. An additional meta-analysis (17 studies, n = 348) showed that, like other deception measures, RT deception measures are susceptible to countermeasures. Whereas our meta-analysis corroborates current cognitive approaches to deception, the observed heterogeneity calls for further research on the boundary conditions of the cognitive cost of deception. RT-based measures of deception may have potential in applied settings, but countermeasures remain an important challenge. LYING TAKES TIME 3

Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) involves deficits in the reward system. While neuroimaging studies have focused on affective stimulus processing, few investigations have directly addressed deficits in the anticipation of incentives. We examined neural responses during gain and loss anticipation in patients with MDD before and after treatment with a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI). Fifteen adults with MDD and 15 healthy participants, matched for age, verbal IQ and smoking habits, were investigated in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study using a monetary incentive delay task. Patients were scanned drug-free and after 6 weeks of open-label treatment with escitalopram; controls were scanned twice at corresponding time points. We compared the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response during the anticipation of gain and loss with a neutral condition. A repeated measures ANOVA was calculated to identify effects of group (MDD vs. controls), time (first vs. second scan) and group-by-time interaction. Severity of depression was measured with the Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression and the Beck Depression Inventory. MDD patients showed significantly less ventral striatal activation during anticipation of gain and loss compared with controls before, but not after, treatment. There was a significant group-by-time interaction during anticipation of loss in the left ventral striatum due to a signal increase in patients after treatment. Ventral striatal hyporesponsiveness was associated with the severity of depression and in particular anhedonic symptoms. These findings suggest that MDD patients show ventral striatal hyporesponsiveness during incentive cue processing, which normalizes after successful treatment.

Cognitive theories on deception posit that lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the truth. In line with this idea, it has been demonstrated that deceptive responses are typically associated with increased response times and higher error rates compared to truthful responses. Although the cognitive cost of lying has been assumed to be resistant to practice, it has recently been shown that people who are trained to lie can reduce this cost. In the present study (n = 42), we further explored the effects of practice on one’s ability to lie by manipulating the proportions of lie and truth-trials in a Sheffield lie test across three phases: Baseline (50% lie, 50% truth), Training (frequent-lie group: 75% lie, 25% truth; control group: 50% lie, 50% truth; and frequent-truth group: 25% lie, 75% truth), and Test (50% lie, 50% truth). The results showed that lying became easier while participants were trained to lie more often and that lying became more difficult while participants were trained to tell the truth more often. Furthermore, these effects did carry over to the test phase, but only for the specific items that were used for the training manipulation. Hence, our study confirms that relatively little practice is enough to alter the cognitive cost of lying, although this effect does not persist over time for non-practiced items.

The cognitive view on deception proposes that lying comes with a cognitive cost. This view is supported by the finding that lying typically takes longer than truth telling. Event-related potentials (ERPs) provide a means to unravel the cognitive processes underlying this cost.Using a mock-crime design, the current study (n = 20) investigated the effects of deception on the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV), the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP), the Correct Response Negativity (CRN), and the stimulus-locked N200 and P300 components. In line with previous research, lying resulted in more errors, longer reaction times (RTs) and longer RT standard deviations compared to truthful responses. A marginally significant effect suggested a stronger CNV for the anticipation of lying compared to the anticipation of truth telling. There were no significant deception effects on the stimulus-and the response-locked LRPs. Unexpectedly, we found a significantly larger CRN for truth telling compared to lying.Additional analyses revealed an enhanced N200 and a decreased P300 for lying compared to truth telling. Our results support the cognitive load hypothesis for lying, yet are mixed regarding the response conflict hypothesis. Results are discussed with regard to the specific characteristics of our design and their theoretical and applied implications.

The self-concept maintenance theory holds that many people will cheat in order to maximize self-profit, but only to the extent that they can do so while maintaining a positive self-concept. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008, Experiment 1) gave participants an opportunity and incentive to cheat on a problem-solving task. Prior to that task, participants either recalled the Ten Commandments (a moral reminder) or recalled 10 books they had read in high school (a neutral task). Results were consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory. When given the opportunity to cheat, participants given the moral-reminder priming task reported solving 1.45 fewer matrices than did those given a neutral prime (Cohen's d = 0.48); moral reminders reduced cheating. Mazar et al.'s article is among the most cited in deception research, but their Experiment 1 has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the aggregated result of 25 direct replications (total N = 5,786), all of which followed the same preregistered protocol. In the primary meta-analysis (19 replications, total n = 4,674), participants who were given an opportunity