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The introduction of Tagamet in the United States in 1977 represented both a revolution in ulcer therapy and the beginning of an important new industry. Today there are four prescription H2-antagonist drugs: Tagamet, Zantac, PeDcid and Axid, and they comprise a multibillion dollar market for the treatment of ulcers and other gastric acid conditions. In this paper, we examine the determinants of sales in this market, using a carefully constructed data set made possible by IMS America. We concentrate particularly on the marketing of these drugs to physicians through detailing and medical journal advertising, and we make an innovative attempt to distinguish between "industry-expanding" and "rivairous" marketing efforts. We find that the impact of total marketing on the expansion of overall industry sales declines as the number of products on the market increases. In addition, we find that the stock of industry-expanding marketing depreciates at a near-zero rate, while the stock of marketing oriented towards rivairous market share competition depreciates at a 40% annual rate. We also find that the products' sales are affected significantly by price, quality attributes (such as number of FDA-approved indications and number of adverse drug interactions), and order of entry into the market.

Environmental regulation in the United States has undergone a slow evolution from command and control strategies towards market-based regulations. One such innovation is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a regulation that requires polluting firms to publicly disclose information about their toxic emissions. The basic tenet of this regulation is that it corrects for informational asymmetries between polluters and households, allowing communities to pressure polluters to decrease their emissions. Policy-makers have judged the TRI a tremendous success, as national releases declined by 43% between 1988 and 1999. Yet many of the fundamental problems which are known to lead to the classic failure of the Coase theorem (such as high transaction costs and difficulties in organizing) cast doubt on the effectiveness of disclosure rules, alone, to lead to an efficient outcome in the case of pollution. We use an event study methodology with high-quality data on house prices and other local attributes to assess the extent to which the public values changes in toxic releases and thus the success of TRI. Our major findings include: (1) declines in toxic releases appear unrelated to any political economy variables that might lead to public activism; (2) initial information released under TRI had no significant effect on the distribution of house prices; and (3) house prices show no significant impact of declines in reported toxic releases over time. Standard errors are small enough that we can reject the hypothesis that large declines in toxic releases lead to more than a 0.5% increase in house prices. These results also hold when we control for differences in the availability of information on TRI and the possible effect of expectations. Our findings cast doubt on the ability of the public to process complex information on hazardous emissions and support the Coase theorem in that right-to-know laws such as TRI may not be the most effective form of environmental regulation. © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.