We analyze how the degree of parliamentary activity affects both individual MPs' performance in the candidate selection process within the party and their popularity with voters at the electoral stage. We expect that parliamentary work of MPs matters less for voters' evaluations of MPs because of limited monitoring capacities and lower salience attached to this type of representation. The empirical analysis uses data from recent elections in the Czech Republic and Sweden. During the analyzed period, these countries further personalized their flexible list electoral systems. Our results suggest that parties hold MPs accountable mainly through the threat of nonre-selection rather than by assigning them to a promising list position. While there is no evidence that voters consistently reward MPs' effort, the case of the Czech elections in 2010 shows that they may do so if context draws attention to individual MPs' work.

Issue ownership (IO) has been an important concept in the analysis of party behaviour, party strategy and party competition for several decades. More recently, it has also been of growing interest for research on voting behaviour. Traditionally, IO has been regarded as a stable phenomenon where parties have different issue profiles and are advantaged by different political issues or issue‐areas. Recently, however, many studies have reported change and fluctuations of IO, and the same studies also makes it clear that we know surprisingly little about what might cause, or facilitate, change in issue ownership. In fact, we do not even have systematic studies of how stable issue ownership is, or how frequent shifts in issue ownership actually are. The aim of this article is to explore the extent of change and stability in issue ownership in Sweden. For this purpose, the Swedish national election studies from 1979 to 2010 are utilised. Although recent research has indicated that changes in IO have increased over time, this is not supported in the Swedish case. Instead, issue ownership seems never to have been a particularly stable phenomenon. However, in line with our theoretical expectations, we show that ownership of economic issues is more volatile compared to ownership of other issues.

Rational voters care about outcomes, while parties campaign on policy proposals, the outcomes of which are never perfectly known. Can parties exploit this uncertainty to shape public opinion? This article presents a spatial preference model for policy proposals with uncertain outcomes. It reports the results of a large pre-registered survey experiment that involved presenting respondents with predictions about the effects of three policy proposals. The findings show that respondents update their attitudes to the proposals as their beliefs about outcomes change, and that parties are no less able to influence beliefs than non-partisan experts. Contrary to previous research, respondents discount outcome uncertainty by giving equal weight to conflicting optimistic and pessimistic predictions. The study shows that parties can shape public opinion by influencing voter beliefs, and that voters are not repelled by the uncertainty inherent in conflicting information.

Political actors face a trade-off when they try to influence the beliefs of voters about the effects of policy proposals. They want to sway voters maximally, yet voters may discount predictions that are inconsistent with what they already hold to be true. Should political actors moderate or exaggerate their predictions to maximize persuasion? I extend the Bayesian learning model to account for confirmation bias and show that only under strong confirmation bias are predictions far from the priors of voters self-defeating. I use a preregistered survey experiment to determine whether and how voters discount predictions conditional on the distance between their prior beliefs and the predictions. I find that voters assess predictions far from their prior beliefs as less credible and, consequently, update less. The paper has important implications for strategic communication by showing theoretically and empirically that the prior beliefs of voters constrain political actors.