Copredication is the phenomenon whereby two or more predicates are applied to a single argument, but those predicates appear to require that their argument denote different things. This paper focuses on the problem of individuation and counting in copredication: many quantified copredication sentences have truth conditions that cannot be accounted for given standard assumptions, because the predicates used impose distinct criteria of individuation on the objects to which they apply. I propose a compositional system for criteria of individuation and show that it improves predictions regarding the truth conditions of numerically quantified copredication sentences compared to existing accounts. * This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Semantics following peer review.

I present an analysis of the interpretation of anaphora that takes concepts from type-theoretic semantics, in particular the use of the Σ and Π dependent type constructors, and incorporates them into a model-theoretic framework. The analysis makes use of (parametrically) polymorphic lexical entries. The key ideas are that, in the simplest case, eventualities can play the role that proof objects do in type-theoretic semantics; that more complex, compositionally-defined, structures can play that role in other cases; and that pronouns can be modelled by contextdependent functions from proof objects of the preceding discourse (in this sense) to entities.

There are sentences that are coherent and possibly true, but in which there is at the very least the appearance of a conflict between the requirements of two (or more) predicates that are applied to the same argument. This phenomenon, known as copredication, raises various issues for linguistic theory. In this paper I defend and develop an approach to the issues of counting and individuation in copredication put forward in previous work, in dialogue with criticisms made by Liebesman & Magidor and their own positive account of copredication.

Glue Semantics is a theory of the syntax-semantics interface according to which the syntactic structure of a sentence produces premises in a fragment of linear logic, and the semantic interpretation(s) of the sentence correspond to the proof(s) derivable from those premises. This paper describes how Glue can be connected to a Minimalist syntactic theory and compares the result with the more mainstream approach to the syntax-semantics interface in Minimalism, according to which the input to semantic interpretation is a syntactic structure (Logical Form) derived by covert movement operations. I argue that the Glue approach has advantages that make it worth exploring.

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