No abstract

Abstract:In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist's thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists.

Abstract:In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from "Expert E says that p" to "p," where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support-or no support at all-for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on expertise shows that expert opinions are only slightly more accurate than chance and much less accurate than decision procedures. If this is correct, then it follows that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments.Résumé:: Dans cet article, je soutiens que les arguments fondés sur l'opinion des experts, à savoir, les inférences de "Expert E dit que p" à "p", où la valeur de vérité de p est inconnue, sont faibles. Un argument faible est un argument dans lequel les prémisses, même si elles sont vraies, fournissent un soutien faible ou aucun soutien du tout pour la conclusion. De tels arguments sont faibles à moins que l'affirmation d'un expert que p rende p significativement plus susceptibles d'être vrai. Cependant, la recherche sur l'expertise montre que les opinions des experts ne sont que légère-ment plus exactes que les opinons énoncées au hasard et beaucoup moins exactes que les procédures de décision. Si cela est vrai, il s'ensuit que les arguments fondés sur les opinions des experts sont faibles.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms 'knowledge' and 'understanding' significantly more often than the term 'truth' when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms 'knowledge' and 'understanding' when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works.