Turkey has lately been in the midst of trying to resolve its three-decade old struggle with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). Elaborating on the history of this conflict, this study analyzes why previous attempts to resolve it failed and why other conflict-resolution opportunities were not taken until 2007. It devotes particular attention to the emergence and failure of the latest resolution process and analyzes prospects and challenges of a potential resolution by analyzing the context, content, and conduct of Turkey's latest peace attempt. This study finds, first, that the PKK has been open to a negotiated settlement since 1993, but the state regime rejected reconciliation and pursued unilateral military solutions until 2007, when Turkey finally recognized the military stalemate and costly deadlock. Second, it argues that what really forced Turkey to search for a resolution are-in addition to the hurting stalemate-recent national and regional power shifts, which have also destabilized the resolution process itself. Third, this study asserts that despite the ripe conditions for resolution, the context and the content of the latest process revealed crucial deficiencies that require a complete restructuring of the central government as well the need to develop greater institutionalization and social engagement for a potential conflict resolution. Finally, this study claims that the nature and characteristics of the current phase of the conflict, as they stand, indicate significant fragilities and spoiling risks due to both internal and external dynamics and actors, as recent developments have indicated in the failure of the latest resolution attempt.

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By using Social Network Analysis (SNA), this study empirically analyzes five PKK Affiliated narco-terror and five illicit drug networks in the Turkish context to identify and compare their approach to the security-efficiency tradeoff. Results revealed that although terrorist members are in key roles and powerful positions (central and intermediary), average scores of cohesion and centrality of narco-terror networks seem to be only slightly more security driven than those of illicit drug networks. However, analyses of individual networks from both types yield no clear structural distinction in prioritizing between security and efficiency. This study, in general, finds that networks from both camps are structurally more efficiency driven. They are denser with more direct ties; generally clustered into sub-groups attached to networks' cores and peripheries; they reflect coreness, where key players act in pivotal positions with high power, centrality, and brokerage to efficiently control and coordinate network activities. This is then found to cause security vulnerabilities of greater visibility (susceptibility of disruption) and high dependence on central actors constituting structural holes (possible elimination of entire network when compromised). However, sample networks strive to balance the security by keeping the paths-for the flow of information-shorter and being clustered into denser sub-groups with strong pre-existing trust-ties (kinship and friendship) which reduces the risk of detection and infiltration. This study argues that the nature of objective dominates the structural characteristics regarding the security-efficiency dilemma, and thus, both illicit drug and PKK affiliated narco-terror networks in Turkish context are driven by material incentives relying more on efficiency and striving to balance organizational security with social characteristics (trust ties).

This study analyzes the distinction between terrorism and insurgency by drawing upon the case of the PKK conflict in Turkey. It provides a conceptual discussion through multi-dimensional analyses from the actor-oriented, the actionoriented, the purpose-oriented, and the ontology-oriented perspectives. In so doing, in addition to the organizational characteristics, it critically identifies the PKK's varying strategies of terrorist and insurgent violence, and their temporality and reasoning as the conflict unfolded to make conceptual inferences. This study found, first, that while the PKK as an actor indicates an insurgent character, the PKK's use of violence reflects intense terrorism action particularly after its military defeat. Second, the use of terrorism by the PKK reflects an inextricable overlap in temporality and a direct link with guerilla methods. Despite the PKK's terrorist and insurgent violence resulted from different factors and reasoning at the intermediate level; they are designed to converge at the overall aim of the PKK's political campaign. Third, the PKK violence reflects varying purposes of terrorism, e.g., intimidation, attrition, survival and group solidarity. Fourth, after reaching the tipping point that resulted in its military defeat in 1994, the PKK resorted to more indirect and asymmetrical violence in an increasing tendency to deflect state power and, thus, to coerce Turkey into a political compromise, i.e., a negotiated settlement.

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