We have applied the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning to interpret inconsistencies in student reasoning approaches to physics problems. This study was motivated by an emerging body of evidence that suggests that student conceptual and reasoning competence demonstrated on one task often fails to be exhibited on another. Indeed, even after instruction specifically designed to address student conceptual and reasoning difficulties identified by rigorous research, many undergraduate physics students fail to build reasoning chains from fundamental principles even though they possess the required knowledge and skills to do so. Instead, they often rely on a variety of intuitive reasoning strategies. In this study, we developed and employed a methodology that allowed for the disentanglement of student conceptual understanding and reasoning approaches through the use of sequences of related questions. We have shown that the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning can be used to account for, in a mechanistic fashion, the observed inconsistencies in student responses. In particular, we found that students tended to apply their correct ideas in a selective manner that supported a specific and likely anticipated conclusion while neglecting to employ the same ideas to refute an erroneous intuitive conclusion. The observed reasoning patterns were consistent with the heuristic-analytic theory, according to which reasoners develop a "first-impression" mental model and then construct an argument in support of the answer suggested by this model. We discuss implications for instruction and argue that efforts to improve student metacognition, which serves to regulate the interaction between intuitive and analytical reasoning, is likely to lead to improved student reasoning.

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