-This article conceptualises 'food fraud' by shifting analytical focus away from popular/policy conceptions foregrounding the centrality of organised crime towards understanding the factors that shape the organisation of food frauds. We argue that food fraud, rather than being an 'exogenous' phenomenon perpetrated by externally organised (transnational) 'criminal enterprise', is better understood as an 'endogenous' phenomenon within the food system where legitimate occupational actors and organisations are in some way necessarily involved. Criminal opportunities arise under conducive conditions as part of legitimate actors' routine behaviours. Our contention is that the common definition of food fraud is too prescriptive and fails to allow space to

There is much talk surrounding food fraud policy, and while there is convergence around the need to 'do something about it', there can be divergence around how this should be done as seen in the decisions and actions of concerned stakeholders. However, underpinning the policy agendas in relation to food fraud there is an aim to prevent (or at least reduce) food fraud, crime and harms, to improve the integrity of the food system. This article develops a mode of analysis that integrates 'enterprise theory' with 'situational prevention theory' to develop an understanding of how food frauds are situated actions, shaped by contingent enterprise conditions that influence how food frauds are organised and why decisions to offend become rational. We apply this integrated framework to the Spanish olive oil market. Drawing on data collected on market conditions and case study analyses of particular frauds to better understand the situated nature of food frauds we suggest mechanisms that could be used to prevent fraud in particular situations under these conditions. We conclude that this mode of thinking and analysis can be applied to a range of frauds across different food networks.

Recent large-scale cases involving multinational corporations such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals illustrate the difficulties faced by the UK and German sovereign states in controlling complex trans-national and multi-jurisdictional crimes. This article analyses the mixture of enforcement (e.g. criminal prosecution, civil sanctioning), self-regulatory (e.g. transnational business initiatives, corporate compliance) and hybrid (e.g. self-reporting, self-investigation) mechanisms that are emerging as part of UK and German responses to controlling transnational corporate bribery. This regulatory landscape incorporates a diverse array of direct and indirect state (e.g. investigatory and prosecutorial agencies) and non-state (e.g. private sector enterprises, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations) 'regulatory' actors of varying levels of formality. Mechanisms of a self-regulatory nature vary in terms of their mandatory/voluntary requirements and manufactured/organic formation. However, there is an assumption that the emergence of a variety of enforcement, self-regulatory and innovative hybrid mechanisms is sufficient but in reality this is not the case. Instead, the key argument of the article is that while these mechanisms are aiding the response, they are likely to fail leading to the default position of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high.

Abstract:This article analyses the finances for and the finances from corporate bribery in international business transactions and how they are organised. Transnational corporate bribery involves non-criminal commercial enterprises that operate in licit markets but that use corrupt means to win or maintain business contracts in foreign jurisdictions. This article first considers what needs to be financed, how much finance is needed, and how the bribes can be generated and distributed. Second, the article considers the different forms of proceeds that emerge out of the bribery, how offenders must conceal the derivation of funds from these crimes while also retaining control over them, and how they must overcome particular obstacles. Finally, the article discusses responses to the proceeds of bribery and related anti-money laundering provisions, before analysing actual and potential mechanisms for intervening with the finances for and from transnational corporate corruption.

This article analyses how the monies generated for, and from, corporate financial crimes are controlled, concealed, and converted through the use of organisational structures in the form of otherwise legitimate corporate entities and arrangements that serve as vehicles for the management of illicit finances. Unlike the illicit markets and associated 'organised crime groups' and 'criminal enterprises' that are the normal focus of money laundering studies, corporate financial crimes involve ostensibly legitimate businesses operating within licit, transnational markets. Within these scenarios, we see corporations as primary offenders, as agents, and as facilitators of the administration of illicit finances. In all cases, organisational structures provide opportunities for managing illicit finances that individuals alone cannot access, but which require some element of third-party collaboration. In this article, we draw on data generated from our Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research (PaCCS)-funded project on the misuse of corporate structures and entities to manage illicit finances to make a methodological and substantive addition to the literature in this area. We analyse two cases from our research-corporate bribery in international business and corporate tax fraud-before discussing three main findings: (1) the ostensible legitimacy created through abuse of otherwise lawful business arrangements; (2) the effective anonymity and insulation afforded through such misuse; and (3) the necessity for facilitation by third-party professionals operating within a stratified market. The analysis improves our understanding of how and why business offenders misuse what are otherwise legitimate business structures, arrangements, and practices in their criminal enterprise.