I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Auction, VCG mechnism, Ex-post equilibrium, Efficiency., JEL Classification Numbers: D44.,

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We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders. This paper extends both Maskin's result and the single-crossing condition to the case of TV bidders. We introduce the generalized single crossing-a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise singlecrossing-and show that it is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in the iV-bidder English auction.

We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders. This paper extends both Maskin's result and the single-crossing condition to the case of TV bidders. We introduce the generalized single crossing-a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise singlecrossing-and show that it is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in the iV-bidder English auction.

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