This paper investigates the determinants of tenure decisions in Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland for professorships in economics, business administration and related fields. Our dataset comprises candidates who were awarded tenure as well as those who were eligible but were not tenured. We show that business candidates have a higher probability of being tenured than economists. Youth, marital status and publications matter; gender and children do not. The market for first appointments in economics relies much more on publication performance than the market for business administration. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal Compilation Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.

We reply to a comment by Diamantopoulos and Wagner questioning the face validity of our research productivity ranking for the field 'Marketing and Sales'. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal Compilation 2009 Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009.

The O-Ring theory is used to analyze the emergence of¯rms organized as partnerships. The owner-managers of such entrepreneurial rms bene¯t from ability matching within their production teams. However, they must bear the project risk. Risk-aversion then induces a second-best solution. Integrated¯rms managed on behalf of riskneutral residual-claimants face information and/or enforcement problems. Hence, they cannot organize ability-matched teams. There exists an equilibrium such that groups of individuals sharing a superior ability level will found entrepreneurial¯rms. Low-quality individuals will be employed by managed¯rms which hire randomly.

No abstract

Adverse selection induces economic limits to market substitution. If quality uncertainty persists in both Internet and traditional marketplaces, a second-best equilibrium with parallel market segments may arise. The information cost advantage of one marketplace is exactly offset by a more severe adverse selection problem associated with non-observable quality variables. The electronic marketplace providing dominant search means contains all segments, while the traditional market may lack some segments. These missing segments are characterized by low quality expectations given the set of advertised quality signals. The analytic results are confirmed by an empirical investigation of used-car trade. Thus the study also provides an estimate of the price differential between the electronic and the traditional marketplace.E-COMMERCE, Market Substitution, Adverse Selection, Efficient Search And Learning,