The concept of industrial clusters has attracted much attention during the past decade, both as descriptive of an increasingly important phenomenon and as a basis for effective public intervention in the economies of lagging city-regions. However, there is much ambiguity in the way in which this concept is used, presenting an obstacle both to empirical testing and to realistic assessments of policy relevance. In this paper, we distinguish three ideal-typical models of processes which may underlie spatial concentrations of related activities, with very different implications both in terms of relevant evidence and the scope for promotional policies. Survey data for the London conurbation are used to explore the relation between concentration and different forms of linkage, with results which point to the dominance of pure agglomeration effects in this context at least.

The mismatch between local voting and the local economic consequences of Brexit. Regional Studies. This paper reveals that in the 2016 UK referendum regarding whether to remain in or leave the European Union, the regions that voted strongly for leave tended also to be those same regions with greatest levels of dependency on European Union markets for their local economic development. This observation flies in the face of pro-leave narratives that posited that the major beneficiaries of European Union membership were the 'metropolitan elites' of London. Economic geography dominated the observed voting patterns, and geography will also certainly dominate the post-Brexit economic impacts, but not necessarily in a way that voters anticipated or wished for. KEYWORDS regions; European Union; voting; trade; demand 摘要 英国脱欧的地方投票与地方经济结果之间的不同调。Regional Studies. 本文揭露 2016 年英国有关是否续留或脱离欧 盟的公投中，强力投票支持脱欧的区域，同时也很可能是该地的在地经济发展对欧盟市场依赖程度最高的区域。此 一观察当面拒斥了主张欧盟会员资格的主要受益者是伦敦 '大都会精英' 此般支持脱欧的叙事。经济地理支配了观察 到的投票模式，而地理必将同时支配脱欧后的经济冲击，但不必然是透过选民所期待或希冀的方式。 关键词 区域; 欧盟; 投票; 贸易; 需求 RÉSUMÉDisparité entre le vote local et les conséquences économiques du Brexit. Regional Studies. La présente communication révèle que lors du référendum de 2016, au Royaume-Uni, qui devait décider si le Royaume-Uni souhaitait rester dans l'Union européenne ou la quitter, les régions qui votèrent le plus fort pour quitter l'UE sont également celles qui présentent une dépendance plus prononcée des marché de l'Union européenne pour leur développement économique local. Cette observation va à l'encontre des discours favorables au départ de l'UE, qui soutenaient que les principaux bénéficiaires de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne sont les «élites métropolitaines» de Londres. La géographie économique domina les tendances du vote, et la géographie dominera sans aucun doute, une fois de plus, les conséquences économiques du Brexit, mais pas nécessairement de la façon prévue ou souhaitée par les électeurs.

This paper examines the issue of whether the UK displays high levels of interregional inequality or only average levels of inequality. The question arises due to major differences in public perceptions. Following on from recent UK public debates, the UK evidence is examined in the context of 28 different indicators and 30 different Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Answering this question involves a careful consideration of the ways in which we use different spatial units of analysis, different measures of prosperity and different indices of inequality in order to understand interregional inequality, and the issues that arise are common to all countries. In the specific case of the UK, the result is clear. The UK is one of the most regionally unbalanced countries in the industrialized world.

In this paper we employ an extension of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) with regional detail for EU countries to study the degree to which EU regions and countries are exposed to negative trade-related consequences of Brexit. We develop an index of this exposure, which incorporates all effects due to geographically fragmented production processes within the UK, the EU and beyond. Our findings demonstrate that UK regions are far more exposed than regions in other countries. Only regions in the Republic of Ireland face exposure levels similar to some UK regions, while the next most affected regions are in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This imbalance may influence the outcomes of the negotiations between the UK and the EU. KEYWORDSBrexit, input-output analysis, regional differences, trade, value chains | INTRODUCTIONSince the UK decided in 2016 by referendum to leave the European Union there has been a large and growing body of material explaining the reasons for the decision in both the academic arena as well as in the popular press. In contrast, there has been much less post-referendum material emerging regarding the likely long-term impacts of this decision, and there are probably two main reasons for this. First, there were various forecasts produced by different organizations prior the -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. referendum which predicted a rapid UK recession immediately following the decision to leave, and this has simply not transpired. Although there is now emerging evidence of the effects of a devalued Sterling on UK inflation and living standards (Financial Times, 2017a), as well as a fragile trade balance even under currency depreciation, the fact that no UK recession has so far materialized (The Economist, 2017) probably makes many forecasters rather loathe to speculate any further.Second, and more importantly, Brexit has not yet actually happened, and it is very difficult to speculate in detail about the likely long-run impacts of Brexit until the specific outlines of the new UK-EU trading relationships become clear.What we aim to analyse here is the exposure of regions in the UK and the EU to Brexit, via an analysis of the nature and scale of their trade linkages. Other potential advantages and disadvantages, for example as a consequence of the relocation of UK subsidiaries of multinational firms or the redistribution of subsidies to regions are not considered. 1 In this study, we intend to quantify the shares of regional and national GDP and labour income (in the UK and the EU) that are at risk due to Brexit. The extent to which these risks will actually materialize, for example via tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade between the EU and the UK, will depend on the final agreements reached (if...