No abstract

<p>This thesis consists of three substantive studies about the Vietnam stock market. In particular, I study the asymmetric information, corporate governance (CG) practices, and foreign investment of publicly listed companies in Vietnam, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  In Chapter 2, I investigate the effectiveness of a market surveillance system (MSS) on improving the market quality of the Vietnam stock market, as measured by liquidity and informed trading level. I find that market liquidity decreased after the introduction of the MSS, and that the effect is more pronounced for small firms. Although informed trading, on average, does not change significantly after the MSS, subsample analysis indicates a significant decrease in informed trading among large and liquid firms.  In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between firms’ CG practices and informed trading. I find a negative relationship between the two variables. Firms with better CG practices have a lower level of informed stock trading. Moreover, a natural experiment on a shock of firms’ CG practices generated by the CG policies shows that the negative relationship between CG practices and informed trading is a causal one, in which a change in the former causes a change in the latter. In another analysis around the implementation of the MSS, I find that the implementation of the surveillance system affects the relationship between the two variables, and this effect is driven by large and liquid firms.  In Chapter 4, I investigate whether foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are informed about firms’ performance. Using the residuals of foreign investor ownership as a measure of the abnormal foreign investor holding, I find that the abnormal foreign investor holding is positively correlated with firm performance in the following one year. I also find a positive correlation between abnormal foreign investor holding and the stock returns in the next three quarters. These findings indicate that foreign investors are informed about the firms up to a one-year period.</p>

No abstract

<p>This thesis consists of three substantive studies about the Vietnam stock market. In particular, I study the asymmetric information, corporate governance (CG) practices, and foreign investment of publicly listed companies in Vietnam, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  In Chapter 2, I investigate the effectiveness of a market surveillance system (MSS) on improving the market quality of the Vietnam stock market, as measured by liquidity and informed trading level. I find that market liquidity decreased after the introduction of the MSS, and that the effect is more pronounced for small firms. Although informed trading, on average, does not change significantly after the MSS, subsample analysis indicates a significant decrease in informed trading among large and liquid firms.  In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between firms’ CG practices and informed trading. I find a negative relationship between the two variables. Firms with better CG practices have a lower level of informed stock trading. Moreover, a natural experiment on a shock of firms’ CG practices generated by the CG policies shows that the negative relationship between CG practices and informed trading is a causal one, in which a change in the former causes a change in the latter. In another analysis around the implementation of the MSS, I find that the implementation of the surveillance system affects the relationship between the two variables, and this effect is driven by large and liquid firms.  In Chapter 4, I investigate whether foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are informed about firms’ performance. Using the residuals of foreign investor ownership as a measure of the abnormal foreign investor holding, I find that the abnormal foreign investor holding is positively correlated with firm performance in the following one year. I also find a positive correlation between abnormal foreign investor holding and the stock returns in the next three quarters. These findings indicate that foreign investors are informed about the firms up to a one-year period.</p>