Conflict caused by wild herbivores damaging crops is an almost universal problem in conservation. We designed and implemented a game-theory-based system for supporting farmers whose crops were being heavily damaged by wild herbivores. In this communityoperated system, farmers self-report their production, which is endorsed by neighboring farmers. The average deficit in production is compensated for by a payment that is directly proportional to the average deficit in production of the group and to the individual farmer's productivity. As a result, farmers are compensated for the average damage (support) and rewarded for individual productivity (reward) (i.e., support cum reward [SuR]). The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. Farmers who underreport receive less payment because the SuR amount is proportionate to their self-reported productivity. The endorsing farmers, in their own self-interest, prevent overreporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is a stable strategy based on honesty and hard work. In 2 villages along the western boundary of Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve in central India, we tested the system with 75 farmers over 6 crop seasons. After a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed throughout the group. Average crop productivity increased 2.5-fold, in spite of damage, owing to increased effort by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution, the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioral green revolution in agriculture. KEYWORDS crop insurance, evolutionary game theory, experimental socioeconomics, human-wildlife conflict, support cum rewardCombinación entre el Pago por Daños a Cultivos y la Recompensa por Productividad para Abordar el Conflicto con la Fauna Resumen: El conflicto causado por herbívoros silvestres que dañan los cultivos es casi un problema universal para la conservación. Diseñamos e implementamos un sistema basado en la teoría de juegos para apoyar a los agricultores cuyos cultivos estuvieran siendo dañados considerablemente por los herbívoros silvestres. En este sistema operado comunitariamente, los agricultores reportan por sí mismos su producción, la cual es endosada por los agricultores vecinos. El déficit promedio en la producción se compensa con un pago que es directamente proporcional al déficit promedio en la producción del grupo y a la productividad individual del agricultor. Como resultado, los agricultores son compensados por el daño promedio (apoyo) y recompensados por la productividad individual (recompensa) (es decir, apoyo con recompensa [SuR]). El diseño del juego es tal que solamente la declaración honesta otorga la máxima ganancia. Los agricultores que declaren menos de lo dañado reciben menor pago porque la cantidad SuR es proporcional a su productividad auto declarada. Los agricultores que los endosan, por interés propio, previenen que haya declaraciones por encima de lo realmente producido. El sistema involucra varias situaciones

The Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve (TATR) is an important nature conservation area for the country having a good population of wild animals. However, on the fringes of this national park, there are issues of human-wildlife conflict such as crop raiding by wild animals, which is an underestimated problem. The constant threat of crop predators and perceived loss in crop produce has discouraged agriculture in close vicinity of the park. Farming is the main livelihood for the people living near TATR, therefore it is an urgent need to keep under review the alternative options that can contribute to farmers’ welfare. Considering the developing medicinal plant demand, there is potential in cultivating non-palatable traded medicinal plant species that are resistant to crop-raiding by wildlife. The paper suggests such a model for farmers. We focus on research, awareness, motivation, facilitation and establishing market linkages.