Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the gender diversity on boards and its effect on stock market liquidity in French boardrooms. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of French firms between 2002 and 2012 listed on the Paris Stock Exchange (SBF120), the study uses ordinary least squares and three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions to address endogeneity concerns on the board gender diversity. Findings The results show that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly associated with the presence of women directors. The authors find that investors’ decisions vary according to their positions in the board: women independent members decrease illiquidity costs, while the presence of female inside directors increases daily trading volume. In addition, the presence of female inside directors increases the firm’s ability to implement better strategies that cope with economic, social and environmental constraints which leads investors to positively react. Surprisingly, the presence of female independent directors reduces company involvement in sustainable development projects. Practical implications The empirical findings contribute to the current debate on the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards and the effectiveness of gender-quota laws. It shows that appointing insider female’ directors incite investors to trade more stocks while appointing independents ones reduces their trading costs. Social implications This paper shows that the benefits of female directors appointing depend on their independence of management team. Originality/value This study addresses the endogeneity between stock market liquidity, corporate governance and gender diversity. It is the first study to distinguish between the effects of women inside and independent directors on investors’ trading decisions.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of female members in boards of directors on asymmetric information in the French stock market. Design/methodology/approach The authors use two proxies for asymmetric information: the idiosyncratic volatility and the bid-ask spread. This study is conducted on all listed firms in the SBF 120 index between 2002 and 2012. Findings Results show that gender diversity in boardrooms has a negative effect on the level of private information in stock markets and reduces the bid-ask spread. However, these effects are significant in family-controlled firms: female inside directors significantly increase the idiosyncratic volatility and the bid-ask spread, while female independent directors decrease both proxies for stock market liquidity. Research limitations/implications Our empirical findings contribute to the current debate on the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards from the market perspective. It shows that, under specific conditions, financial markets could be receptive to the presence of female directors in boardrooms. Practical implications Practitioners and policymakers advocate the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards. This paper shows that when the protection of minority shareholders is poor, the stock market is receptive to the presence of women independent directors, only in family controlled firms. This is a further argument that could help women to overcome glass-ceiling barriers they usually face to achieve top management positions. Originality/value This paper provides support for the increased attention paid to gender-diverse boards. It addresses the market sensitivity toward the presence of women members in French boardrooms and their positions. This is the first paper, to the best of our knowledge, to address how appointing women to different positions in the boardroom could provide signals to investors in the presence of asymmetric information. French firms are mostly family controlled. Thus, the findings bring valuable information of the impact of board diversity on the stock market considering family and nonfamily firms.