A symmetric group key agreement protocol enables the group members to derive a shared session key for secure communication among them, whereas an asymmetric one facilitates security to any communication from outside, without adding outsiders into the group. In order to combine both the functionalities, a hybrid key agreement protocol is needed, which can output a shared symmetric key for inside communication and an asymmetric key pair for any unrestricted sender. The application mentioned in this paper pushes the need of secure on-chip communication for intersecure and intrasecure zones simultaneously. In particular, we look forward for a solution to ensure communication security among multiple processing clusters actively running on an integrated circuit.The proposed protocol offers a lightweight symmetric encryption for intrazone communication and a public key encryption for interzone communication taking most advanced security issues into account.An extended abstract of this contribution has already been published 1 at Privacy, Security & Trust (PST) 2018.

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SUMMARYMulti-proxy signature is one of the useful primitives of the proxy signature. Till now, only a few schemes of identity-based multi-proxy signature (IBMPS) have been proposed using bilinear pairings, but most of the schemes are insecure or lack a formal security proof. Because of the important application of IBMPS scheme in distributed systems, grid computing, and so on , construction of an efficient and provable-secure IBMPS scheme is desired. In 2005, Li & Chen proposed an IBMPS scheme from bilinear pairings, but their paper lacks a formal model and proof of the security. Further, in 2009, Cao & Cao presented an IBMPS scheme with the first formal security model for it. Unfortunately, their scheme is not secure against the Xiong et al's attack. In this paper, first, we present an IBMPS scheme, then we formalize a security model for the IBMPS schemes and prove that the presented scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Also, our scheme is not vulnerable for the Xiong et al's attack. The presented scheme is more efficient in the sense of computation and operation time than the existing IBMPS schemes.

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