This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.

2.Our sample is limited to the banking and insurance industries, which S&P has chosen to include in their ERM quality review. As noted later in the paper, results from highly regulated industries might not apply to other sectors. 3.While we include a series of lagged control variables to rule out the alternative explanation that poor ERM results in higher risk, we cannot entirely rule out this possibility.

PurposeThe paper aims to examine the relation between fees paid to auditors and audit quality during the period of 2000‐2003.Design/methodology/approachThe paper constructs a measure of auditor profitability that is used as a proxy for auditor independence. The methodology is grounded in the notion that auditor independence is influenced by effort and risk‐adjusted fees, rather than the level of fees received from clients. Since, risk and effort are unobservable, the paper uses proxies based on client size, complexity and risk to estimate abnormal fees. Abnormal fees are derived using a fee estimation model drawn from prior literature. The paper employs two metrics to assess audit quality – the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash flows and the absolute value of performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals.FindingsThe paper documents a statistically significant negative association between total fees and both audit quality proxies over all years. These findings are robust to a variety of additional tests and several alternative design specifications. The results (pre‐ and post‐SOX) are consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather than auditor reputational concerns.Research limitations/implicationsThe possibility that the empirical tests do not completely capture the impact of unobserved risk cannot be ruled out, though the paper attempts to do so by employing alternative specifications and sensitivity tests.Practical implicationsPolicy makers should note that current restrictions on the provision of non‐audit services may not sufficiently resolve the issue of economic bonding and its impact on auditor independence.Originality/valueIn contrast to previous studies whose results are ambiguous, the paper finds a statistically significant positive association between several measures of total fees (it uses size‐adjusted and abnormal fees) and two metrics of accruals quality in all years (2000‐2003), consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather then auditor reputation concerns.

No abstract

We propose a new measure of accounting reporting complexity (ARC) based on the count of accounting items (XBRL tags) disclosed in 10-K filings. The preparation and disclosure of more accounting items is complicated because it requires greater knowledge of authoritative accounting standards. This aspect of complexity can increase the likelihood of mistakes, incorrect application of GAAP, and can ultimately lead to less credible financial reports. Consistently, we find that ARC is associated with a greater likelihood of misstatements and material weakness disclosures, longer audit delay, and higher audit fees. In comparison to commonly used measures of operating and linguistic complexity, the associations between ARC and these outcomes are more consistent, exhibit greater explanatory power, and have stronger economic significance. These and additional validation and robustness tests suggest that ARC more completely reflects accounting complexity. In addition, ARC exhibits several advantageous properties, including across- and within-firm variation, availability for the universe of SEC filers, and a direct connection to accounting, inherent in its derivation from detailed accounting disclosures. Finally, because it relies on a comprehensive set of detailed accounting data, ARC broadly captures accounting complexity, while, at the same time, it can be disaggregated into account-specific measures of complexity. JEL Classifications: M41; M43. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper. A similar version of ARC, based on company XBRL filings that were downloaded directly from the SEC, is available at http://www.xbrlresearch.com.