ABSTRACT:The ethics of high frequency trading are obscure, due in part to the complexity of the practice. This article contributes to the existing literature of ethics in financial markets by examining a recent trend in regulation in high frequency trading, the prohibition of deception. We argue that in the financial markets almost any regulation, other than the most basic, tends to create a moral hazard and increase information asymmetry. Since the market’s job is, at least in part, price discovery, we argue that simplicity of regulation and restraint in regulation are virtues to a greater extent than in other areas of finance. This article proposes criteria for determining which high-frequency trading strategies should be regulated.
This paper develops a new performance measurement methodology for algorithmic trading. By adapting capability from the quality control literature, we present new criteria for assessing control, expected tail loss and risk-adjusted performance in a single framework. The multi-scale capability measure we present is more descriptive and more appropriate for algorithmic trading than the traditional measure used in finance. It is robust to non-normality and the multiple time horizon decision processes inherent in algorithmic trading. We also argue that an algorithmic trading strategy, indeed any investment strategy, which satisfies the criteria to be multi-scale capable also satisfies any definition of prudence. It will be unlikely to harm the investor or external market participants in the event of its failure, while providing a high likelihood of satisfactory risk-adjusted performance.
International audienceThe last few decades has seen an ever-increasing growth in the way activities are productized and associated with a financial cost. This phenomenon, termed financialization, spans all areas including government, finance, health and manufacturing. Recent developments within finance over that past decade have radically altered the way trading occurs. This paper analyses high-frequency trading (HFT) as a necessary component of the infrastructure that makes financialization possible. Through interviews with HFT firms, a software vendor, regulators and banks, the effects of HFT on market efficiency, and its impact on costs to long-term investors are explored. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the conflict that exists between HFT and traditional market makers in today’s fragmented markets. This paper argues that society should be unconcerned with this conflict and should instead focus on the effects these participants have on the long-term investors, for whom the markets ultimately exist. In order to facilitate the best outcomes, regulation should be simple, aimed at keeping participants’ behavior stable, and the interactions among them transparent and straightforward. Financialization and HFT are inextricably linked, and society is best served by ensuring that the creative energy of these market participants is directed on providing liquidity and removing inefficiencies
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