What happens when a new social convention replaces an old one? While the possible forces favoring norm change-such as institutions or committed activists-have been identified for a long time, little is known about how a population adopts a new convention, due to the difficulties of finding representative data. Here, we address this issue by looking at changes that occurred to 2,541 orthographic and lexical norms in English and Spanish through the analysis of a large corpora of books published between the years 1800 and 2008. We detect three markedly distinct patterns in the data, depending on whether the behavioral change results from the action of a formal institution, an informal authority, or a spontaneous process of unregulated evolution. We propose a simple evolutionary model able to capture all of the observed behaviors, and we show that it reproduces quantitatively the empirical data. This work identifies general mechanisms of norm change, and we anticipate that it will be of interest to researchers investigating the cultural evolution of language and, more broadly, human collective behavior.

Multilayer and multiplex networks represent a good proxy for the description of social phenomena where social structure is important and can have different origins. Here, we propose a model of opinion competition where individuals are organized according to two different structures in two layers. Agents exchange opinions according to the Abrams-Strogatz model in each layer separately and opinions can be copied across layers by the same individual. In each layer a different opinion is dominant, so each layer has a different absorbing state. Consensus in one opinion is not the only possible stable solution because of the interaction between the two layers. A new mean field solution has been found where both opinions coexist. In a finite system there is a long transient time for the dynamical coexistence of both opinions. However, the system ends in a consensus state due to finite size effects. We analyze sparse topologies in the two layers and the existence of positive correlations between them, which enables the coexistence of inter-layer groups of agents sharing the same opinion.

We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a multiplex network. We show that the coupling between these dynamical processes can lead to cooperation in scenarios where the pure game dynamics predicts defection. In addition, we show that the structure of the network layers and the relation between them can further increase cooperation. Remarkably, if the layers are related in a certain way, the system can reach a polarized metastable state. These findings could explain the prevalence of polarization observed in many social dilemmas.