In this study, we use a survey instrument to obtain perspectives from over 700 auditors about present-day audit workloads and the relationship between audit workloads, audit quality, and job satisfaction. Our findings indicate that auditors are working, on average, five hours per week above the threshold at which they believe audit quality begins to deteriorate and often 20 hours above this threshold at the peak of busy season. Survey respondents perceive deadlines and staffing shortages as two of the primary reasons for high workloads and further believe that high workloads result in decreased audit quality via compromised audit procedures (including taking shortcuts), impaired audit judgment (including reduced professional skepticism), and difficulty retaining staff with appropriate knowledge and skills. We also find that auditors' job satisfaction and their excitement about auditing as a career are negatively impacted by high audit workload, particularly when the workload exceeds a threshold that is perceived to impair audit quality. Overall, our findings provide support for the PCAOB's recent concern that heavy workloads are continuing to threaten audit quality and suggest that the primary drivers of workload (i.e., deadlines and staffing problems) might be the actual "root cause" of workload-related audit deficiencies.

Research documents significant management bias and opportunism around the discretionary inputs of audited complex estimates, including fair value measurements (FVMs), which raises questions about auditors' ability to test these estimates. We examine how the degree of quantification in client evidence and client control environment risk influence auditors' planned substantive testing of management's discretionary inputs to FVMs. We find that auditors allocate a lower proportion of effort to testing the subjective inputs to the fair value estimate when the degree of quantification in the client evidence and level of client risk are both high. Further, this tendency persists even after auditors receive a regulatory practice alert reminding them to focus more audit effort on testing fair value (FV) inputs that are susceptible to management bias, and despite the auditors increasing their overall audit effort. Qualitative analyses of the procedures auditors selected indicate that inapt attention to the degree of quantification in evidence is a potential root cause of the difficulty auditors encounter when testing complex estimates. Our results imply that in situations where both quantified and non-quantified data are important to the audit, there is the potential for management to manipulate the evidence they provide to auditors to distract auditors from testing the discretionary inputs to complex estimates that are susceptible to management opportunism. Data Availability: Contact authors for data availability.

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This study draws upon research on escalation of commitment, motivated reasoning, and prior involvement to formulate hypotheses about the effects of prior auditor involvement and client pressure on the magnitude of proposed audit adjustments. Consistent with theory, our experimental results reveal that auditors who have no involvement in waiving a prior period audit adjustment propose current period audit adjustments that are significantly larger than auditors who have involvement in waiving a prior period audit adjustment. Further, we find that client pressure significantly reduces the magnitude of proposed audit adjustments, although the effect of client pressure does not vary across levels of prior involvement. This suggests that client pressure continues to exert a meaningful influence on auditor judgments in the post-SOX environment.

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