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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the seeming paradox that underpins Nigeria’s war on corruption. This paradox centres on the undue interference of the presidency in the war against corruption. This interference has resulted in selective prosecutions and a deceleration in the tempo of the anti-corruption crusade. Design/methodology/approach The study used an admixture of primary and secondary data to evaluate whether indeed Nigeria is fighting against corruption to win it. The primary data were derived from key informant interviews. A total of ten diverse experts were interviewed through the instrumentality of unstructured set of questions, which were administered to them with room for elaboration. The secondary data were sourced from archival materials. Findings The findings of the study centre on three key issues: a characteristic one-sidedness in the prosecution of alleged corruption offenders by the anti-graft agencies. Those with pending corruption cases who have decamped to the ruling All Progressives Congress have had their cases placed in abeyance. There is evidence of the politicisation of the war against corruption as well as evidence of weak institutionalisation, which robs the anti-corruption agencies of the capacity to act independently. Practical implications The anti-corruption war may likely be derailed if the operational efficiency of the anti-graft agencies is not enhanced and their independence guaranteed. Social implications If the anti-corruption crusade fails, it will have multiple negative domino effects on national development and quality of life of the Nigerian people. Originality/value The paper is original because no recent study has interrogated the declining efficiency of Nigeria’s anti-graft agencies or linked this declining efficiency on weak institutionalisation and interference from the presidency.

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