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With electronic warfare increasingly complicated and military confrontations increasingly intense, the potential security threat to satellite navigation has become a difficult issue to deal with. Traditional satellite navigation anti-interference technology generally refers to jamming, but less consideration has been given to spoofing. It should be noted that the potential risk induced by spoofing interference is worse than that caused by jamming as the loss of positioning integrity may not be immediately obvious. This paper introduces a spoofing detection method based on a two-antenna structure using fraction parts of double-difference carrier phase observables. If all spoofing signals are transmitted by one single antenna, a spoofing detection hypothesis test can be carried out through the normalisation of double-difference carrier phase observables, without need to consider the integer ambiguity problem, measure the baseline vector and estimate the real directions of signals. The detection scheme adopts an M of N algorithm (if M or more of the test values exceed the threshold, the algorithm declares the presence of a spoofing signal), integrating carrier phase measurements of all the available satellites. Finally, the proposed method is verified by real experiments. This spoofing detection method can easily be applied to GNSS anti-spoofing receivers without changing their architecture and has simple and effective characteristics.

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