PurposeThis study investigates the relationship between family-managed firms and firm employment growth by considering the effects of location and economic crisis as moderating variables.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses random-effect models on a large panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms covering 2003 to 2015 to estimate the joint effects of municipality size and economic crisis on firm employment growth.FindingsThe analysis reveals a positive association between family-managed firms and employment growth. However, this association is not uniform across space and time. When it considers location, the study finds that municipality size positively affects employment growth in family-managed firms but not in non-family firms. Additionally, while the study reveals that both firm types experience negative employment growth during the early stage of the global economic crisis (2007–08), it also finds that family-managed firms located in small municipalities downsize less than their non-family counterparts.Originality/valueThis study provides new evidence on the resilience of family-managed firms during economic crises, particularly those located in geographically bounded settings, such as small municipalities. When an adverse event, such as an economic crisis, jeopardizes employment levels, the embedded and trust-based relationships, between a family firm and its community leads them to prioritize employees' claims. However, family-managed firms' commitment to preserve jobs in small municipalities cannot be maintained over the long term; this effect disappears if the economic crisis is protracted. This study sheds new light on family-managed firms' distinctive behavior toward with local communities.

This paper provides empirical evidence of family firm corporate governance structures, by examining a set of corporate governance characteristics of 132 non-financial Spanish listed firms. Results show that family firm boards present differential characteristics and that different patterns of family ownership configurations do not affect family firm corporate governance structures. We find that Spanish family firm boards are smaller than those in non-family firms. Family firm directors own a larger fraction of firm shares and have longer Chairman tenure than non-family firms, and family firms use fewer voluntary board committees – such as nomination and remuneration committees and executive committees. Besides, family firm boards and committees are biased towards insiders. Whether these differential characteristics affect other minority non-family shareholders negatively remains an open question.

This paper provides empirical evidence of family firm corporate governance structures, by examining a set of corporate governance characteristics of 132 non-financial Spanish listed firms. Results show that family firm boards present differential characteristics and that different patterns of family ownership configurations do not affect family firm corporate governance structures. We find that Spanish family firm boards are smaller than those in non-family firms. Family firm directors own a larger fraction of firm shares and have longer Chairman tenure than non-family firms, and family firms use fewer voluntary board committees -such as nomination and remuneration committees and executive committees. Besides, family firm boards and committees are biased towards insiders. Whether these differential characteristics affect other minority non-family shareholders negatively remains an open question.

This paper analyses the effect of the Spanish privatisation process on the performance and corporate governance of the firms that were privatised through public offerings over the 1985-2003 period. Using conventional pre- versus post-privatisation comparisons, we do not find significant improvements in privatised firms' profitability and efficiency. However, our results do suggest a change in firms' ownership structure and in the characteristics of Boards of Directors after privatisation. Firms' ownership concentration decreases as a consequence of the relinquishment of control by the State and the Boards of Directors are restructured with the creation of new specialised committees and the incorporation of more executives. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el papel de la propiedad familiar en la política de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa (RSC) medida ésta a partir de varios indicadores de transparencia informativa sobre las acciones sociales y medioambientales realizadas por las empresas. Utilizando una muestra de empresas no financieras españolas en el periodo 2004-2010 e identificando el último gran propietario de la compañía a partir de las cadenas de propiedad, encontramos que el compromiso en RSC es menor en empresas con propiedad familiar, si bien, los resultados no indican que la presencia del fundador de la compañía afecte significativamente a las políticas informativas de la empresa. Por otro lado, los resultados relativos al efecto del control ejercido por las familias sobre la transparencia en RSC son mixtos, sugiriendo que el control familiar influye en la política de dar información o no sobre RSC, pero no en la amplitud de la información suministrada al mercado.